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Through Virtual Worlds and Computer Games 
Jon M. Garon

 
What sport shall we devise here in this garden, 
To drive away the heavy thought of care? 
 William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Richard the Second, Act III, Scene 
IV 
Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play.  It is bound up with hatred, jealou-
sy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing vi-
olence: in other words it is war minus the shooting. 
 George Orwell, Shooting an Elephant 
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INTRODUCTION: LET THE GAMES BEGIN 
Free agency started it all.  Like the professional athletes a generation 
earlier, the elite computer gamers playing Madden Football wanted to 
move players from team to team.  As with fantasy sports leagues, the ga-
mers wanted to create rosters that matched up from week to week.  A few 
wanted cross-over players to join in. 
Soon, an online game developed.  Clever programmers, illustrators, 
and sports aficionados created ―PRO‖(www.pro.us), an interactive online 
gaming environment featuring virtual replicas of all starting professional 
athletes in football, baseball, basketball, soccer, hockey, tennis, boxing (full 
contact) and golf.  The professional women‘s leagues were represented 
along with the men‘s leagues.  Players could be used in their professional 
sport or imported to any of the other sports represented in the game.  La-
crosse and gladiator fighting competitions were quickly added and proved 
some of the most popular.  In some games, gamers would control entire 
teams while in others a gamer would control only his or her own character, 
allowing dozens of online gamers to participate at once.  (This was difficult 
in football, but worked very well for gladiatorial fights in the Hippodrome 
and the Roman Coliseum.)  As a default design, players generally wore 
their own team numbers and uniforms, but gamers could re-outfit the cha-
racters with any of the available professional, minor league, or university 
team indicia available in the ―locker room.‖  ―Celebrity Death Match‖ be-
came a popular mini-game. 
Gamers were charged a monthly subscription fee, with additional 
costs for purchasing uniforms in the locker room.  More entrepreneurial 
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gamers set up design studios, selling original team logo designs, uniforms, 
equipment and weapons to enhance the play of the characters.  Characters 
became ―avatars.‖1  A gamer soon became able to edit the selected athlete, 
changing not only the team uniform but also the physical attributions of the 
player.  Gamers increased the skill level for the characters and avatars on 
their team rosters through play or purchase of digital steroids and virtual 
growth hormones. 
Nobody paid the players, their unions or the professional sports lea-
gues.  Pictures, descriptions and accounts of games—both copies and orig-
inals—were completely unauthorized. 
In the final innovation before the lawsuits began, statistics from week-
ly fantasy sports play was added.  Each week, the game ―replayed‖ a high-
light reel featuring play of fantasy teams against each other in fantasy lea-
gues.  With the nearly photographic quality of the animation, these fifteen 
minute highlight shows became as popular as some network broadcasts, 
appearing on YouTube and other websites. 
PRO‘s popularity rivaled the Super Bowl.  Thousands of gamers regu-
larly spent time acting out their professional games; tens of thousands were 
heavy users.  Millions of occasional gamers held accounts.  Advertisers 
vied to purchase billboard space and naming rights to the virtual arenas and 
stadiums.  Only the leagues, unions, players, networks, and videogame 
publishers objected. 
The development of law within and about virtual worlds will remain a 
complex and conceptually challenging exercise for years to come.  In many 
respects, the commercial and social interactions within virtual worlds are 
essentially the same as those interactions conducted face-to-face or over 
less engrossing technologies.  In certain respects, however, the immersive 
nature of the virtual world redefines the nature of the experience. 
Because virtual worlds mimic their brick-and-mortar counterparts, 
they exhibit commercial attributes unlike those of plays, television shows, 
or motion pictures.  To the extent that there is commerce conducted within 
the medium, the historic separation between commercial conduct and ex-
pressive speech must be reconceptualized.  In the first instance, such legal 
line drawing will necessarily be done with crude tools, so this article sug-
gests that just as the theatre and motion picture industries turned to collec-
tive bargaining agreements to provide a more refined set of rules for pro-
fessional content development, the entertainment content created in virtual 
worlds will benefit from similar collective bargaining solutions to legally 
difficult conundrums. 
 
 1 The description used above distinguishes between avatars, which are individuated representa-
tions of the computer user from characters, which may be substantially the same identity for every 
computer user interacting with that aspect of the game.  Like Mickey Mouse, Mario and Kirby are cha-
racters in a game rather than avatars representing the person operating the controls. 
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Part I of this article provides an overview of virtual worlds and the le-
gal framework for the regulation of content ownership.  Part II addresses 
the tension between the speech and property rights associated with the par-
ticipants in this new art form, identifying what the law suggests and how it 
should evolve through case law and legislation.  Part III suggests the steps 
that can be taken through private ordering collective bargaining arrange-
ments to further clarify the protections for professionals associated with 
this developing new medium. 
I.  CONTENT OWNERSHIP INSIDE COMPUTER GAMES AND 
VIRTUAL WORLDS 
A. Origins 
Since the advent of Pong,2 computer gamers have been searching for 
increasingly realistic—or, at least, photorealistic—experiences with their 
computer-generated content.  As the technology has allowed for ever more 
realistic images, sound, and even tactile response, the gaming experience 
has grown far beyond high-score lists to become immersive, interactive en-
vironments.  The ―virtual environment is an interactive computer simula-
tion which lets its participants see, hear, use, and even modify the simu-
lated objects in the computer-generated environment.‖3  As described by 
the plaintiff in a legal action against Second Life, ―many people ‗are now 
living large portions of their lives, forming friendships with others, build-
ing and acquiring virtual property, forming contracts, substantial business 
relationships and forming social organizations‘ in virtual worlds such as 
Second Life.‖4 
Attributes of the genre include the ability to involve a very large num-
ber of simultaneous participants online through the Internet or other net-
working systems, and the ability for the participant to take on a character or 
role in the game.  As some of these gaming environments involve millions 
of players, they are now coined, ―massively multi-player online role-
playing game (MMORPG).‖5  The user-created characters in these worlds 
are referred to as ―avatars,‖ virtual representations of the players.6 
 
 2 ―Pong, while not the first videogame, was the first coin-op arcade game and the first main-
stream videogame that was available to almost everyone.  Pong was the impetus for the development of 
the video gaming industry, almost single-handedly creating both the home and the arcade videogame 
markets.‖  ClassicGaming.com‘s Museum: Atari Pong 1975–1977, http://classicgaming.gamespy.com 
(follow ―Features: Console Museum‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Pong‖ hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 16, 
2008). 
 3 Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the 
Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649, 649 (2006) (footnote 
omitted). 
 4 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 5 Barfield, supra note 3, at 650; see also Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User 
Created Content and Building the Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 82 (2004); Caroline Bradley 
& A. Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds, Real Rules, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 103, 121 (2004). 
 6 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595.  The Bragg court also described avatars, explaining that 
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The online role-playing games trace their lineage to Dungeons & 
Dragons and the genre of role-playing games, in which participants would 
create characters who would navigate in the fictional worlds created and 
managed by ―dungeon masters.‖7  In Dungeons & Dragons, the players 
would give themselves the attributes of wizards, warriors, trolls, elves, and 
similar mythic characters.  The interaction of the players and their charac-
ters would last in story arcs that could run for indefinite periods.  There 
may even be some characters still in use from 1974 when the rules were 
first published.8  Character attributes were kept on note cards and interac-
tions mediated through polyhedral dice. 
The Dungeons & Dragons genre moved to the online environment 
with games such as World of Warcraft, The Lord of the Rings Online: Sha-
dows of Angmar, Warhammer Online, EVE Online, Anarchy Online, Ru-
neScape, Rappelz, and Shadow of Legend.9  The genre also includes 
science fiction worlds such as The Matrix Online and Star Wars Galaxies.10 
Professor Erez Reuveni suggests two attributes that define the 
MMORPG and virtual worlds, separating them from classic computer or 
their Dungeons & Dragons predecessors.11  ―Unlike traditional computer 
games, . . . virtual worlds are persistent and exist independently of any in-
dividual‘s presence.  Virtual worlds exist in real time even after a specific 
player logs off, and a person’s actions can permanently shape the virtual 
world.‖12  While this is a literary distinction, the persistence and literary in-
dependence may also provide a framework for treating certain aspects of 
these works as distinct from novels, computer games, or motion pictures. 
The persistence and literary independence of online role-playing 
games have spawned an entirely new genre from the fantasy worlds.  In 
environments such as Second Life13, Moove14, Active Worlds15, or There16, 
the environment is a fantasy alternative to modern reality, with businesses, 
lounges, universities, and other brick-and-mortar equivalents.  These envi-
ronments are ―near worlds,‖ or alternate realities set in the present with on-
 
―[s]ince the advent of computers, however, ‗avatar‘ is also used to refer to an Internet user‘s virtual re-
presentation of herself in a computer game, in an Internet chat room, or in other Internet fora.‖  Id. at 
595 n.3. 
 7 GameSpy.com, Magic & Memories: The Dungeons & Dragons Index, http://pc.gamespy. 
com/articles/538/538848p1.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
 8 Id. 
 9 All of these games can be found at http://www.gamespy.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 10 These two games can also be found at http://www.gamespy.com.  The science fiction role-
playing counterpart to Dungeons & Dragons was Traveller, designed by Marc Miller for Game Design-
ers‘ Workshop in 1977.  Wikipedia, Traveller (role-playing game), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Traveller_(role-playing_game) (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
 11 Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the Virtual 
Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261 (2007). 
 12 Id. at 265. 
 13 http://secondlife.com. 
 14 http://www.moove.com. 
 15 http://www.activeworlds.com. 
 16 http://www.there.com. 
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ly modest changes from the world around us: 
On the surface, Second Life is an online place somewhat similar to a Sims com-
puter game, with buildings and roads and a population of avatars—cartoonish re-
presentations of users.  Anyone can join, and users chat with each other, build 
houses, start businesses, go to concerts, and otherwise hang out together.  The 
site is winning the attention of Internet heavy hitters . . . who believe Second 
Life—or something like it—will evolve into a way to use the Net that is more 
like the way humans use the real world.  In that way, it could mark a next great 
leap in the Net’s accessibility.17 
The attraction of virtual worlds comes from the technological oppor-
tunities to animate and enhance the interactions on a borderless, interna-
tional landscape; the billions of dollars in revenue to be earned by the pub-
lishers and purveyors of these environments; and a growing cultural and 
commercial environment within each of the virtual worlds.  Corporations, 
for example, are exploring the use of Second Life as a methodology and 
platform for employee training.18  As communications educator Montse 
Anderson noted, ―programs such as Second Life have the potential to en-
hance learning because they allow people to interact with each other, rather 
than reading a manual.‖19 
The growth of virtual worlds is coming from a tremendous curiosity 
about these opportunities and a dramatic shift in the spending of the enter-
tainment dollar.  Games are projected to increase from nine to thirteen per-
cent of annual entertainment spending per household by 2010.20  The 
growth of virtual worlds has significant economic potential.  The online 
game market has already surpassed both video and music sales.21  At 
present, the revenue is $4 billion per year.22  ―Strategy Analytics reckons 
the online games market could triple in size over the next five years, bal-
looning to $11.8 billion.‖23  Even more than size, the online monthly ser-
vice relationship allows for better management of accounts, increasing pay-
ing customers even in markets known for high piracy.  For example, China 
is ―where [World of Warcraft] has really taken off . . . . [With] 3.5 million 
players—paying up in a land where piracy has been a problem for other 
media companies, and demonstrating that it is possible to create online con-
 
 17 Kevin Maney, The king of alter egos is surprisingly humble guy: Creator of Second Life’s 
goal? Just to reach people, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2007 at 1B. 
 18 Andrew Johnson, Virtual Training: Phoenix Couple Launch Venture to Help Companies Use 
Virtual World to Educate, Orient New Employees, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 2007, at B6. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Global Information, Inc., TV To Dominate Future Home Entertainment Spending, 
http://www.the-infoshop.com/press/itm34591_en.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).  The report also pre-
dicts continued growth in television, particularly because of the digital delivery of the medium, while 
recorded music will continue to decline as a percentage of the household entertainment dollar.  Id. 
 21 Matt Vella, Tolkien’s Virtual World Takes Off, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 28, 2007, 
http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/sep2007/id20070928_550277.htm?chan=search. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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tent that people will pay for.‖24 
The explosive growth of the revenue and the financial models that in-
corporate an active, engaged and participatory audience will deliver the ul-
timate media product.  The benefit of persistence, literary independence 
and interactivity results in an ongoing user participation, which requires 
consumers to pay to remained subscribed.  Moreover, the virtual environ-
ments create opportunity for advertisers to place goods and services in front 
of consumers in a variety of methods—which will fuel advertiser spending 
and consumer behavior.  In addition to creating stories and audience enter-
tainment, the persistence and literary independence of the medium provides 
an ideal environment in which to place advertising and products.25 
Even in the medium of an interactive, virtual world, the distribution of 
producer-created content will continue to co-exist with participant-created 
content.  The literary independence does not require that content come only 
from participants, so it is likely that producer-created content will play a 
significant role in many of the games and worlds popular within the ge-
nre.26  As a variation of traditional theatre, the coexistence might manifest 
as the ability for both professional and amateur actors to utilize avatars to 
perform scripted productions.  The entire canon of Shakespeare‘s plays will 
eventually be available as performed in animation—avatar performances 
by amateur and professional acting companies.  Moreover, the choice of 
avatar will undoubtedly include the public’s affinity for their stars.  What 
better for an amateur actor than to portray the avatar of a famous perfor-
mer?  The aspiring professional actress will be able to shine with a nod to 
the femme fatales of the past?27 
In the realm of sports, a simple version of this opportunity regularly 
takes place.  Through the use of game controllers, players control profes-
sional athletes competing in all major professional sports.  Madden Foot-
ball, a game licensed by the National Football League and Players, Inc., the 
for-profit arm of the National Football League Player‘s Association,28 has 
 
 24 Dan Sabbagh, This virtual world yields very real profits, TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2007, (Fea-
tures), at 3. 
 25 But, despite the growth of gaming, the same studies suggest television will continue to domi-
nate the entertainment medium.  Television will increase from 44% of home spending to 53% of home 
spending.  Global, supra note 20.  This suggests that watching television, whether on broadcast, cable, 
digital, or Internet, will continue to be a significant, if not dominant medium.  Vella, supra note 21. 
 26 Because producer-created content can be used to set professional norms through collective 
bargaining agreements, the presence of such content may be critical to the development of the medium.  
See infra Part III. 
 27 I imagine, as one such production, a restaging of King Lear played by James Earl Jones with a 
Darth Vader avatar and avatars from within the Star Wars cavalcade.  Jar Jar Binks or Yoda can play 
the Fool and Princess Leia serves well as Cordelia, but there is only Queen Padme as another female 
character.  So, casting for Regan and Goneril would be difficult. 
 28 Troy Wolverton, Electronic Arts Lands an NFL Exclusive, THE STREET.COM, Dec. 13, 2004, 
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10198835.html; NFL Players Association, Players, Inc., 
http://www.nflpa.org/Departments/PlayersInc.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
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become one of the most popular video games of all time.29  The football 
play calling, player control and immersive graphics make Madden Football 
only slightly less immersive than the virtual worlds or online role-playing 
games.30  To find players who are not under the Players, Inc. contract, for-
mer all-star players have been signed to participate in a competing prod-
uct.31  If not already possible, it is inevitable that the games genres will 
combine, allowing role-playing athletes to compete as teams using their fa-
vorite player‘s attributes. 
From an economic and social standpoint, both law and industry must 
help determine whether the professional athletes and professional actors are 
entitled to compensation for being utilized as part of this entertainment 
product.  Should an author have unbridled right to excerpt celebrities‘ iden-
tities from real life when creating upon a digital, interactive canvas?  The 
athletes certainly care.  ―[M]any professional athletes have grown up play-
ing sports video games.  Players have even lobbied game companies to im-
prove their digital representations.‖32  Such economic interests create po-
werful incentives to maximize ownership of content within the computer 
games and virtual worlds as well as protect the limitations on such content 
ownership. 
B. First Amendment Protection for Computer Games and Virtual Worlds 
The question of content ownership within computer games and virtual 
worlds assumes that the games and worlds are authorial, creative content, 
benefiting from the full panoply of legal protections.  It has been long held 
that computer programs are literary works, protected by copyright laws.33  
Beyond copyright, the law must reflect the changed paradigm of the com-
puter games and virtual worlds.  While the makers of Pong had no point of 
 
 29 Kevin Gemmell, Video Scouting—For sports fans and video gamers—even NFL players—it’s 
a mad, mad, mad, mad, “Madden 2007” world, where graphics are good and a team’s playbook is as 
real as it gets, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Sept. 3, 2006, at C. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Seth Schiesel, With Famed Players, Game Takes on Madden’s Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2007 at C3. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int‘l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).  The House Report on the 
1976 Act contains the following statement: 
The term ―literary works‖ does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative 
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional works 
and compilations of data.  It also includes computer data bases and computer programs to 
the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original 
ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves. 
Id. at 875 n.4 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976)); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin 
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs, Databases, and Computer Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 977, 979 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protec-
tion for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984); cf. Midway Mfg. 
Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479 (D. Neb. 1981) (copyright infringement involving Pac-
Man, Galaxian, and Rally-X). 
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view being espoused by their square ball or simple paddles, modern games 
can be violent, sexy, propagandistic, satirical or politically astute.34  At 
some point, the authors of these games tapped them for their expressive 
ability.  The law has slowly followed suit. 
The tardiness of the law to recognize the legitimate expressive inter-
ests of entertainment media is not a new concern.  Since at least 1915, the 
question of the applicability regarding First Amendment rights has been 
reassessed by the courts with the introduction of each medium.  In Mutual 
Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,35 a filmmaker facing a censor 
board challenged the state law claiming violations of free speech rights36 as 
well as interference with interstate commerce.37  ―The Mutual‖38 brought 
both state39 and federal free speech claims.40  Because the Supreme Court 
did not apply the First Amendment to the states until 1925,41 the federal 
claim was exceptionally weak and technically beyond the power of the 
court.42  Looking at the state speech protection, the court endeavored to as-
sess the extent to which silent movies were protected as ―speech, writing or 
printing‖43: 
Are moving pictures within the principle, as it is contended they are?  They, in-
deed, may be mediums of thought, but so are many things.  So is the theatre, the 
circus, and all other shows and spectacles; and their performances may be thus 
brought by the like reasoning under the same immunity from repression or su-
pervision as the public press,—made the same agencies of civil liberty . . . . 
We immediately feel that the argument is wrong or strained which extends the 
guaranties of free opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are ad-
 
 34 E.g., Chris Morris, Your Tax Dollars at Play: U.S. Army gets into the gaming business. You're 
paying for it, CNNMONEY.COM, June 3, 2002, http://money.cnn.com/2002/05/31/commentary/game_ 
over/column_gaming (describing computer game recruiting tools by the U.S. Army). 
 35 236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
 36 Id. at 239–40.  The state law provision in question read as follows: ―Only such films as are in 
the judgment and discretion of the board of censors of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless 
character shall be passed and approved by such board.‖  Id. at 240. 
 37 Id. at 239; see Jon M. Garon, Entertainment Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 559, 637–38 (2002) (―The 
interstate commerce argument was, in many ways, the more practical of the two arguments.  Films were 
admittedly shipped in interstate commerce; the exhibitors often owned or were members of consortia 
that crossed state lines.  Interstate commerce was a justiciable issue for the federal courts.‖). 
 38 The term ―The Mutual‖ represented both the company and case.  John Wertheimer, Mutual 
Film Reviewed: The Movies, Censorship, and Free Speech in Progressive America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 158, 159 (1993). 
 39 Mut. Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 239.  The Ohio Constitution also has a strong free speech clause: 
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the li-
berty of speech, or of the press.  In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be giv-
en in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as 
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted. 
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 40 Mut. Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 230. 
 41 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 42 Mut. Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 243. 
 43 Id. 
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vertised on the bill-boards of our cities and towns . . . and which seeks to bring 
motion pictures and other spectacles into practical and legal similitude to a free 
press and liberty of opinion. 
The judicial sense supporting the common sense of the country is against the 
contention.44 
The Court took over three decades to reverse this position regarding 
such ―spectacles‖ and other entertainment.45  In 1948, the Court articulated 
a new philosophy regarding the role of the First Amendment: 
We do not accede to appellee‘s suggestion that the constitutional protection for a 
free press applies only to the exposition of ideas.  The line between the informing 
and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right.  Everyone 
is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.  What is one man‘s 
amusement, teaches another‘s doctrine.46 
Relying on this expansive language, the Court eroded limitations on 
the First Amendment based on medium and, in 1952, the Court reversed 
the Mutual decision and protected motion pictures despite their largely 
commercial nature and their proclivity for greater evil—both accusations 
hurled today at computer games and virtual worlds: 
It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment‘s aegis 
because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business 
conducted for private profit.  We cannot agree.  That books, newspapers, and 
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a 
form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.  We 
fail to see why operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of 
motion pictures. 
It is further urged that motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particu-
larly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression.  Even if 
one were to accept this hypothesis, it does not follow that motion pictures should 
be disqualified from First Amendment protection.  If there be capacity for evil it 
may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but 
it does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have here.47 
Despite the Court‘s explicit rejection of the regulatory rationales in the 
context of motion pictures, modern legislatures have again introduced these 
arguments.48  The municipal bodies and state legislatures have attempted to 
ban or restrict certain aspects of video games, suggesting that the nature of 
the video game industry makes the content unworthy of constitutional pro-
tection or that the way in which these diversions are attractive to youth 
 
 44 Id. at 243–44; see DONALD E. LIVELY, MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 10 (1991). 
 45 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, Comm‘r of Educ. of N.Y., 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); LIVELY, 
supra note 44, at 10. 
 46 Winters v. N.Y., 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
 47 Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501–02 (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)) (footnotes omitted). 
 48 Video Software Dealers Ass‘n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 (RMW), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57472 at *25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007). 
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make censorship more appropriate.49  They return to the same themes es-
poused in Mutual and Joseph Burstyn: ―Several decades ago, the Supreme 
Court ‗recognized that some believe motion pictures possess a greater ca-
pacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other 
modes of expression.‘‖50 
Courts have been steadfast in their refusal to allow prohibitions or 
criminal sanctions for the sale of ultra-violent or sexually explicit video 
games.51  For example, a 2000 St. Louis County, Missouri ordinance made 
―it unlawful for any person knowingly to sell, rent, or make available 
graphically violent video games to minors, or to ‗permit the free play of‘ 
graphically violent video games by minors, without a parent or guardian’s 
consent.‖52  In reviewing the ordinance, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals accepted the premise that ―‗material that contains violence but not 
depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct cannot be obscene.‘  Simply 
put, depictions of violence cannot fall within the legal definition of obscen-
ity for either minors or adults.‖53  The Eighth Circuit was quite mindful of 
the law‘s slow embrace of motion pictures as a form of expressive speech 
and took pains to avoid the same error: 
We recognize that while children have in the past experienced age-old elemental 
violent themes by reading a fairy tale or an epic poem, or attending a Saturday 
matinee, the interactive play of a video game might present different difficulties 
. . . . The fact that modern technology has increased viewer control does not 
render movies unprotected by the first amendment, and equivalent player control 
likewise should not automatically disqualify modern video games that are ―ana-
lytically indistinguishable from . . . protected media such as motion pictures.‖ 
We note, moreover, that there is no justification for disqualifying video games as 
speech simply because they are constructed to be interactive; indeed, literature is 
most successful when it ―draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with 
the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to experience 
their joys and sufferings as the reader‘s own[.]‖54 
 
 49 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.14 (2008) (criminalizing video games that appeal to a mi-
nor's morbid interest in violence); St. Louis County Ordinance No. 20,193 (Oct. 26, 2000); REV. CODE 
INDIANAPOLIS/MARION, IND.§§ 831-1, 831-7 (2008). 
 50 Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472 at *9 n.2 (quoting Interstate Cir-
cuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968)). 
 51 E.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass‘n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); Am. 
Amusement Mach. Ass‘n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472; Entm‘t Software Ass‘n. v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006); 
Entm‘t Software Ass‘n. v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006); Entm‘t Software Ass‘n v. 
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entm‘t Software Ass‘n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 
2d 1051 (E.D. Ill. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass‘n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 
2004). 
 52 Interactive Digital Software, 329 F.3d at 956. 
 53 Id. at 958 (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass‘n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 
1992)) (brackets omitted). 
 54 Id. at 957 (quoting Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002); 
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass‘n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)) (second ellipses in orig-
inal). 
GARON 11/10/2008 3:05 PM 
476 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:465 
The Eighth Circuit correctly refuses to make any First Amendment 
distinctions based on the interactive nature of the experience or of the form 
the new media is beginning to take.  In correctly refusing to make such ca-
tegorical exceptions, however, the decisions may be going too far in the 
opposite direction, cloaking the speech aspects of the interactive games 
with too broad a penumbra.  The Eighth Circuit refused to allow St. Louis 
County to label graphic content ―obscene‖ to minors, finding that histori-
cally only sexual content can be deemed obscene.55  In doing so, the court 
rejects the attempt to make a new category of unprotected speech for vio-
lent content that is sold to minors, despite the lawful regulation of non-
obscene sexually explicit content sold to minors56 and commercial advertis-
ing directed at minors.57 
The attempt to create additional categories of speech that can be regu-
lated with regard to minors is certainly not new.  Broadcast regulation has 
added mandatory children’s programming,58 technological blocking meas-
ures,59 viewer ratings,60 and Internet privacy protections.61  So much for 
―no law‖—Congress has been quite active balancing the interests of speak-
ers and their audience.62 
Of course, as with the attempts to regulate sexually explicit content, 
any such laws must avoid creating an unlawful burden on the production of 
protected speech for adults when building these protections for minors.63  
But given the wide-ranging nature of the content being developed (and de-
scribed below), a much more nuanced approach will be needed to balance 
the various types of speech that will exist within the games and virtual 
worlds under development.  In the context of sexually explicit material 
made available to minors, the Supreme Court found that there could be 
regulation which was sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the governmen-
tal interest of protecting the minors which did not burden the free speech 
 
 55 See Interactive Digital Software, 329 F.3d at 958. 
 56 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).  The Eighth Circuit suggests that the 
content in question in Ginsberg ―did not involve protected speech,‖ Interactive Digital Software, 329 
F.3d at 959, but such a suggestion is erroneous—creating a circular argument.  While it is axiomatic 
that obscene materials (which have no constitutional protection for any reader) can be banned for child-
ren, the Supreme Court recognizes the state‘s interest in protecting children from harmful speech that is 
beyond regulation for adults.  While a modern court may demand a more substantial standard than that 
of Ginsberg, the interest in protecting minors from harmful content has not been repudiated.  Cf. FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978) (coupling the ―ease with which children may obtain 
access‖ with the concerns expressed in Ginsberg to justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting). 
 57 Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see also Cass 
R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499 (2000). 
 58 Sunstein, supra note 57, at 508. 
 59 47 U.S.C. § 303 (x) (2000). 
 60 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 140 (1996) 
(was to direct insertion of 47 U.S.C. § 303(w), but did not become effective). 
 61 Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–03 (2000). 
 62 But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (granting preliminary injunction against 
Children‘s Online Protection Act); ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (permanent 
injunction of same). 
 63 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665. 
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rights of the adults.64  Whether geared towards violent content, sexually 
explicit content or both, some additional legal obligations may be placed on 
video arcades and retailers selling to minors.  A balanced approach will be 
necessary that may begin with a robust protection of video games as ex-
pression, but, as with other media, the law must be an appropriate balanc-
ing of interests among First Amendment protection and limits on unpro-
tected speech.65 
C. Copyright‘s First Amendment Accommodations through the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Fair Use 
A second balancing occurs between First Amendment rights of the 
publisher and the intellectual property rights of any third parties who may 
have had some of their work exploited without permission.  Copyright 
holders, trademark owners, athletes, celebrities, and performers holding 
publicity rights all seek to limit what publishers attempt to do with the pro-
prietary content. 
The balancing of interests for First Amendment protection has very 
different assumptions, depending on the nature of the rights at stake.  Since 
computer games and virtual worlds involve copyright, trademarks and con-
tent regulation, in addition to the publicity rights emphasized in this article, 
a brief survey of each helps to illustrate the variety of tests used to balance 
these interests. 
In addressing the limitations placed on a copyright holder‘s interest by 
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court had historically focused on the 
―idea/expression dichotomy,‖66 protecting the public’s right to use the idea 
expressed, but not the particular expression owned by the copyright hold-
er.67  ―[T]he democratic dialogue—a self-governing people‘s participation 
in the marketplace of ideas—is adequately served if the public has access 
to an author‘s ideas, and such loss to the dialogue as results from inaccessi-
bility to an author‘s ‗expression‘ is counterbalanced by the greater public 
 
 64 E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). 
 65 While not the focus of this article, I strongly question the assumption underlying the judicial 
conclusion that obscenity must be limited to sexually explicit material.  While the precedential defini-
tion of obscenity is clear, throughout the Twentieth Century, the First Amendment has been expanded 
to cover additional categories of speech and reduced in the amount and type of content deemed outside 
of constitutional protection.  Even when Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson overturned The Mutual, the 
Court reminded the parties that the ―capacity for evil . . . may be relevant in determining the permissible 
scope of community control.‖  Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).  I do not 
suggest that cities and states should have unrestrained discretion, but neither does the Constitution sug-
gest that the only content so repugnant as to be beyond First Amendment protection is sexually obscene 
speech.  At the periphery of expressive content, regulators should be permitted an opportunity to meet 
constitutional thresholds to establish the case for a compelling state interest in the context of regulating 
access to content for young minors (e.g. rules for children under the age of 13). 
 66 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 67 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  ―In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.‖  Id. 
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interest in the copyright system.‖68  In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises,69 the Supreme Court endorsed this general approach.  
―[C]opyright‘s idea/expression dichotomy ‗strike[s] a definitional balance 
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free 
communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.‘‖70  
―Due to this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work 
becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publi-
cation.‖71 
Dr. Michael D. Birnhack, writing in the Nimmer copyright treatise, 
raised questions regarding the legitimacy of over-reliance on the 
idea/expression dichotomy: 
Consider the photographs from the Vietnam War of the My Lai massacre.  Here 
is an instance where the visual impact of a graphic work made a unique contribu-
tion to an enlightened democratic dialogue.  No amount of words describing the 
‗‗idea‘‘ of the massacre could substitute for the public insight gained through the 
photographs.  The photographic expression, not merely the idea, became essen-
tial if the public was to fully understand what occurred in that tragic episode.  It 
would be intolerable if the public‘s comprehension of the full meaning of My Lai 
could be censored by the copyright owner of the photographs.  Here it would 
seem that the speech interest outweighs the copyright interest.72 
Despite the importance of visually powerful images to the public de-
bate, the publishers of most photographs retain the ability to demand pay-
ment for use of the copyrighted work.  Despite the visually powerful image 
invoked by the treatise, however, few such images exist that do not also in-
corporate the ability of publishers to secure the rights to publish for a fee.73  
Such an image only becomes iconic through public exposure and adoption 
within the public‘s consciousness. 
Instead of using the First Amendment to create an additional, constitu-
 
 68 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.03 [A][2]; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 
1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 69 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 70 Id. at 556 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 
(1983)). 
 71 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991). 
 72 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.03[A][2]. 
 73 But see Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (attempted 
use of copyright ownership to stop unauthorized biography of Howard Hughes not permitted); New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the ―Pentagon Papers‖ case).  In concurrence, 
Justice Brennan expressed the lack of any need to balance copyright interests.  ―[T]he Government is 
not asserting an interest in the particular form of words chosen in the documents, but is seeking to sup-
press the ideas expressed therein.‖  Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).  But see Salinger v. Random 
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (infringement for publication of unpublished letters in biogra-
phy resulting in less access to such unpublished resources); New Era Publ‘ns, Int‘l, ApS v. Henry Holt 
& Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).  In rejecting the lower court‘s rationale for refusing an 
injunction, the Second Circuit commented that ―[t]he public would not necessarily be deprived of an 
‗interesting and valuable historical study,‘ but only of an infringing one.‖  New Era Publ’ns, 873 F.2d at 
584 (quoting New Era Publ‘ns, Int‘l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1528 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
GARON 11/10/2008 3:05 PM 
2008] Playing in the Virtual Arena 479 
tional limitation on the rights of copyright holders, courts have increasingly 
turned to the doctrine of fair use74 to assure that the public‘s access to so-
cially or culturally important aspects of expressive works are not unduly 
restricted by the copyright owners.75  The Supreme Court has made this in-
creased constitutional importance of fair use explicit in Eldred v. Ash-
croft.76  There, the Court raised the implicit protections of fair use to the 
level of constitutional importance: ―[T]he ‗fair use‘ defense allows the pub-
lic to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also 
expression itself for limited purposes.  ‗Fair use‘ thereby affords considera-
ble latitude for scholarship and comment . . . and even for parody . . . .‖77 
Although fair use has been statutorily codified into four prongs, courts 
have been quite adept at reviewing the significance of the usage and the 
lack of legitimate access to the work as part of the analysis.  For example, 
in refusing to enjoin the unauthorized sequel to Gone with the Wind, the 
Eleventh Circuit looked to the harm caused to the well-established classic 
novel against the public’s interest in a unique approach to the well-
established novel.78 
The case closest to the My Lai massacre example comes from the 
famous Zapruder film, which serendipitously captured the assassination of 
John F. Kennedy.79  The owner of the copyright refused to license the im-
ages for use in the defendant‘s book.  In response, the defendant used his 
access to the photographs to steal copies of the images for use in his own 
work.  The district court acknowledged the misconduct of the defendant but 
focused on the elastic nature of the fair use doctrine, drawing the following 
conclusion: 
There is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the mur-
der of President Kennedy.  Thompson did serious work on the subject and has a 
theory entitled to public consideration. . . . The Book is not bought because it 
 
 74 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  The fact that a work is un-
published shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon considera-
tion of all the above factors. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 75 See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1289–90 (2003). 
 76 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 197 (2003). 
 77 Id. at 190 (internal citations omitted)). 
 78 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 79 Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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contained the Zapruder pictures; the Book is bought because of the theory of 
Thompson and its explanation, supported by Zapruder pictures. 
There seems little, if any, injury to plaintiff, the copyright owner.  There is no 
competition between plaintiff and defendants.  Plaintiff does not sell the Zaprud-
er pictures as such and no market for the copyrighted work appears to be af-
fected.  Defendants do not publish a magazine.  There are projects for use by 
plaintiff of the film in the future as a motion picture or in books, but the effect of 
the use of certain frames in the Book on such projects is speculative.  It seems 
more reasonable to speculate that the Book would, if anything, enhance the value 
of the copyrighted work; it is difficult to see any decrease in its value.80 
Such an analysis provides an excellent solution to the problem posed 
by the My Lai photographs.  In the situation where a license is available for 
purchase, then the presumption is that a publisher seeking to use the work 
should secure that license.  Where the content is not available and used in a 
transformative manner,81 such as to propound a new idea or theory, then 
such use should be worthy of fair use protection.82 
A similar situation occurred when an unauthorized use of an artist’s 
evocative and graphic imagery in brochures objecting to ―obscene art‖ was 
held a fair use.83  Fundraising brochures objecting to ―‗offensive‘ and 
‗blasphemous‘ art by the National Endowment for the Arts,‖ used cropped 
images of David Wojnarowicz‘s works in an attempt to shock, offend, and 
motivate donors to object to the government-funded art.84  In such a situa-
tion, it is highly unlikely that the victim of such a campaign would volunta-
rily license his work to the proselytizer, so fair use provides a balancing of 
the interests of the artist and the organization objecting to the work.  If 
there were any example where the First Amendment could be used as an 
independent tool granting access to the content, the political nature of the 
debate over the National Endowment of the Arts and the concomitant re-
fusal by Wojnarowicz to allow such use could suggest that the First 
Amendment would be an independent ground to balance the interests.  The 
court had no need to turn to an independent analysis using the First 
Amendment, however, because the elastic nature of the fair use doctrine 
provides more precedent and a more narrowly balanced framework than 
would a resort to constitutional first principles. 
Copyright fair use makes explicit that ―the effect of the use upon the 
 
 80 Id. at 146. 
 81 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (a more transformative use will 
weigh heavily towards a finding of fair use because the use ―adds something new, with a further pur-
pose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message . . . .  [T]he 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercial-
ism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.‖). 
 82 Compare Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 
1997) (finding the rebroadcast of ―Beating of Reginald Denny‖ not transformative) with Los Angeles 
News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 941 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the short use of a clip of the 
―Beating of Reginald Denny‖ in montage was transformative use). 
 83 Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass‘n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 142–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 84 Id. at 133. 
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potential market for or value of the copyrighted work‖85 must be taken into 
account in determining the scope of fair use.  The inclusion of this aspect of 
the fair use test creates an economic incentive to license copyrighted works 
for exploitation.  Copyright holders are encouraged to license their works 
because of precedent that gives economic protection to the market-based 
licensing while generally granting broader fair use rights to third parties in 
situations where the copyright holder has withheld licensing opportuni-
ties.86  In situations where the copyright holder refuses to license, the equi-
ties tend to shift towards fair use whereas in cases where the third party re-
fuses to seek the license or pay the fee, the equities favor the rights owner. 
Through the use of both the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use, 
copyright holders are free to exploit the exclusive rights of their work 
without unduly limiting the expressive rights of others.  Though the copy-
right owners occasionally object to the uses made by others of their rights, 
the system works to reward innovation, protect the editorial integrity, and 
promote the marketplace of ideas.  These concepts, in turn, have informed 
publicity rights jurisprudence. 
D. Publicity Rights in Avatars 
Publicity rights are the most recent of the intellectual property rights 
to be recognized under the law, evolving into an important economic re-
source for their creators and a tool to manage the editorial and commercial 
integrity of the goods associated with the celebrity exercising the right.  As 
such, protections of the economic and associative rights are similar to those 
of copyright and trademark.  ―The right of publicity is an intellectual prop-
erty right of recent origin which has been defined as the inherent right of 
every human being to control the commercial use of his or identity.‖87  Ath-
letes, actors, and other celebrities expend considerable effort to maximize 
the potential for licensing, commercial exploitation, and identities.  Pub-
lishers, such as EA Sports, invest heavily in these relationships so that their 
titles achieve dominant market presence.88  But the economic interest only 
has market value if the legal interests are respected by third parties and en-
forced by the courts or other relevant bodies. 
The protectible identity of a person is broadly defined.  ―[T]he Right 
of . . . Publicity . . . is generally understood to encompass any personal 
attribute that identifies a particular person.‖89  California statutory law lists 
one‘s ―name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness,‖ as the attributes of 
 
 85 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 86 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 87 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‘g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 88 See, e.g., Gemmell, supra note 29 (describing the relationship between EA and the NFL in 
creating the video game Madden). 
 89 W. Mack Webner & Leigh Ann Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line Between Com-
mercial Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171 (2004). 
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identity.90  While some states have yet to address the cause of action, most 
states provide a statutory cause of action, a common law cause of action, or 
both.91  California‘s common law articulation is typical: ―A cause of action 
for common law misappropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness may be 
pled by alleging: (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the 
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, 
commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.‖92 
The right of publicity is distinct from either an inchoate right to be 
free from defamation or an invasion of privacy.93  One‘s name or appear-
ance in public does not give rise to a publicity rights claim.  ―It is only 
when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defen-
dant‘s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or 
the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded.‖94  There is also some in-
consistency on whether publicity rights are limited to those individuals who 
have exploited their rights commercially—so called celebrities—or wheth-
er the rights are protected for all individuals.95  In both California and New 
 
 90 
Any person who knowingly uses another‘s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, 
in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or 
selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such 
person‘s prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal 
guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a re-
sult thereof. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2007). 
 91 Marshall Leaffer, Symposium: Interdisciplinary Conference on the Impact of Technological 
Change on the Creation, Dissemination, and Protection of Intellectual Property: The Right of Publicity: 
A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2007) (―In the United States, the right of pub-
licity is now found in most states either by statute or by common law interpretation‖). See 1 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 2:1–:2, 6:3, 6:8 (2d ed. 2003). 
 92 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 793 (Ct. App. 1995); see also 
Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998).  Another useful articulation of 
the elements which comprise the infringement of the right are derived from the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition: ―(1) That defendant used plaintiff‘s name as a symbol of his identity (2) without 
consent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage.‖  Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 
S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 93 
The history of the right of publicity is markedly different from that of trademark rights, but 
the right is derived, in part, from the traditional law of unfair competition. A few early cas-
es protected what is now recognized as the right of publicity under the rubric of unfair 
competition, but some courts view the right of publicity as a direct descendant of the right 
of privacy, a very different type of right in no way dependent upon its owner's commercial 
activities. 
1-2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.16 (internal footnotes omitted). 
But if the right of privacy is a component of a broader right of personality, as yet unrecog-
nized under that label in American law but inchoate in the theoretical basis for the law of 
privacy, then it is a suitable matrix from which other rights protective of the personality can 
evolve . . . . 
Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral 
Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 75 (1988). 
 94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d (1977). 
 95 Id. 
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York, for example, there is no distinction based on the prior use.96 
Although the history of publicity rights in the United States can prop-
erly be traced back to 1905,97 the modern age of licensing is better identi-
fied with the victory by Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., that allowed it to en-
force exclusive rights in professional baseball players‘ identity interests to 
help it sell gum by packaging it with baseball cards.98 
Topps began a vigorous program of signing individual standard form 
contracts with thousands of both major and minor league baseball players.  
Under these agreements, each player granted Topps an exclusive right to 
publish his name, picture, signature and biographical sketch ―to be sold ei-
ther alone or in combination with chewing gum, candy and confection or 
any of them.‖99  As consideration, Topps guaranteed the player a lump-sum 
payment of $125.00 for each season in which either his picture was used or 
the player was an active member of a major league club.  These contracts 
ran until Topps had made five years of payments to the individual player.100 
The nature of the rights for baseball ‗players‘ trying to control their 
economic interest for playing cards is not dissimilar to those same athletes 
and actors claiming a right to control their identities when used for com-
mercial purposes in computer games and virtual worlds.  As the right de-
veloped, it needed (and still needs) to be untangled from other personal tort 
claims, such as defamation, false light invasion of privacy, unfair competi-
tion, and misrepresentation.101 
 
 96 CAL CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2007); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2002). 
 97 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69–70 (Ga. 1905) (the first case to recog-
nize the common law right of publicity in the United States).  The common law doctrine was developed 
from the seminal law review article which argued that a common law right of publicity had long existed 
at common law under various names.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Priva-
cy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  The common law right in New York was rejected by the Court of Ap-
peals.  See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902).  New York adopted 
its Civil Rights Law to reverse the court‘s decision. 
 98 Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953); see also Fleer 
Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, 142 (3d Cir. 1981) (reviewing Topps‘ licensing his-
tory). 
 99 Fleer, 658 F.2d at 142. 
 100 Id. 
 101 
[A] man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the ex-
clusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made ‗in 
gross,‘ i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.  Whether it 
be labeled a ‗property‘ right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag ‗property‘ 
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. 
[2] This right might be called a ‗right of publicity.‘  For it is common knowledge that many 
prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings 
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no 
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, 
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.  This right of publicity 
would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive 
grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures. 
Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. 
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In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,102 the Supreme 
Court provided important recognition that publicity rights are a legitimate 
economic interest which can be recognized by states:103 
[T]he State‘s interest in permitting a ―right of publicity‖ is in protecting the pro-
prietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertain-
ment. . . . [T]he State‘s interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and 
copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.104 
The Zacchini decision unequivocally established that state publicity 
rights were not automatically preempted by the First Amendment.  The 
Court did not, however, wrestle with the challenge of the correct balancing 
test between these competing interests. 105 
In Topps, Zacchini, and other cases articulating publicity rights, the 
primary underlying assumption emphasized the commercial rights in one’s 
likeness—that a person owns his or her identity for endorsing or advertis-
ing a product.106  The protection of this interest necessarily includes a pro-
tection of reputation since the endorsement of a poorly manufactured or 
dangerous product would directly harm the reputation of the person giving 
the endorsement.107  This should not blur the parameters of the right, how-
ever, but merely highlight the importance of protecting the use of the right 
as commercially important. 
Courts have expanded the notion of commercial endorsement, howev-
er, to include more creative ways of taking unfair advantage of others.108  
As a result, a bright line distinguishing commercial activities of advertising 
billboards and product packaging from expressive uses in newspapers, 
magazines, plays, films and books has been eroded as parties seek addi-
tional ways of exploiting the good will associated with celebrities for prod-
ucts unrelated to those celebrities.  The distinction may be critically impor-
tant to understand the rights of third parties to exploit celebrity identities: 
[W]hether the use of a person‘s name and identity is ―expressive,‖ in which case 
it is fully protected, or ―commercial,‖ in which case it is generally not protected.  
For instance, the use of a person‘s identity in news, entertainment, and creative 
works for the purpose of communicating information or expressive ideas about 
 
 102 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 103 Id. at 572. 
 104 Id. at 573 (footnote omitted). 
 105 See id. (recognizing the right of publicity as a legitimate cause of action while failing to discuss 
the First Amendment implications). 
 106 See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int‘l, Inc., 125 
F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (use of likeness as animatronic puppets in bars); Abdul-Jabbar v. General 
Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996) (use of prior name for car commercial); Carson v. 
Here‘s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835–36 (6th Cir. 1983) (use of slogan for commode 
sales). 
 107 E.g., Stephanie Strom, A Sweetheart Becomes Suspect: Looking Behind Those Kathie Lee La-
bels, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996, at D1. 
 108 E.g., Nemani v. St. Louis Univ., 33 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (using a research-
er‘s name in a grant application). 
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that person is protected ―expressive‖ speech.  On the other hand, the use of a per-
son‘s identity for purely commercial purposes, like advertising goods or services 
or the use of a person‘s name or likeness on merchandise, is rarely protected.109 
The distinctions between commercial and expressive use has proven 
quite difficult to separate.  There is wide disagreement on the interpretation 
and efficacy of the laws across jurisdictions.110  Because publicity rights are 
creatures of state law, both the articulation of the specific rights and limita-
tions of the interest vary a great deal from state to state.111  In contrast, the 
concern regarding expressive use of identity is the extent to which it im-
pinges on federal constitutional rights of free speech. 
E. Publicity Rights: Accommodations for the First Amendment 
The Zacchini decision unequivocally established that state publicity 
rights were not automatically preempted by the First Amendment.112  The 
Court did not, however, wrestle with the challenge of the correct balancing 
test between these competing interests.  Instead, a variety of state and fed-
eral courts have evolved inconsistent and sometimes incompatible ap-
proaches to create the appropriate balancing of these interests.  Despite a 
good deal of dicta from various courts looking to base their decisions on 
doctrine common across jurisdictions, three fairly distinct lines of decisions 
have developed. 
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,113 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court imported the concept of transformative fair use from 
copyright law as a framework through which the rights of publicity and 
speech could be balanced, describing it as ―at the heart of any judicial at-
tempt to square the right of publicity with the First Amendment.‖114  The 
California Supreme Court attempted to build upon the copyright fair use 
doctrine as a method of separating fair use from protected speech.  As it 
explained, ―both the First Amendment and copyright law have a common 
goal of encouragement of free expression and creativity . . . .‖115  Having 
identified fair use as the framework, the California court set out to create a 
rule under which courts and parties could operate: 
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a ce-
lebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity without 
adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest in pro-
tecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imita-
tive artist.  On the other hand, when a work contains significant transformative 
 
 109 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (citations omitted). 
 110 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. 
Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Mo. 2006) (discussing the right of publicity in various states). 
 111 See, e.g., George P. Smith II, The Extent of Protection of the Individual’s Personality Against 
Commercial Use: Toward A New Property Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002) 
 112 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
 113 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 114 Id. at 808. 
 115 Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is 
also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of 
publicity.  As has been observed, works of parody or other distortions of the ce-
lebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan‘s viewpoint, good substitutes for 
conventional depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten 
markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to pro-
tect.116 
The court in Comedy III recognized that it was not articulating a single 
new legislative decree for publicity rights.  Instead, the court tried to articu-
late its reasoning in a variety of ways.  ―Another way of stating the inquiry 
is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‗raw materials‘ from which 
an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the 
celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.‖117  This 
formulation emphasizes the relevance of the publicity rights to the output 
of the new author or artist.  Incorporation of the identity interests remains 
essential for biographies, news reporting, social commentary, and many 
other forms of protected speech.118 
Perhaps because the case was dealing with parody, in Comedy III, the 
court chose not to incorporate the entirety of fair use, but instead to incor-
porate various prongs of the statutory formulation.119  Parody cases may be 
where the tensions run the highest rather than where the fair use is most ro-
bust.  When asking ―whether a product containing a celebrity‘s likeness is 
so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant‘s own expression 
rather than the celebrity‘s likeness,‖120 parodies of the celebrities are often 
the form of fair use that is most like the celebrity‘s likeness and the least 
transformed. 
Influenced by the particular use before it, the court rejected incorpora-
tion of the fourth statutory fair use element, ―the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.‖121  The limitation 
should be revisited because in many cases outside of parody, such as bio-
graphy, news reporting or commercial endorsement, the potential market 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 809. 
 118 The court‘s own catalog of copyright examples is highly instructive: 
We emphasize that the transformative elements or creative contributions that require First 
Amendment protection are not confined to parody and can take many forms, from factual 
reporting (see, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1968)  
58 Misc.2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129, affd. mem. (1969) 32 A.D.2d 892 301 N.Y.S.2d 
948) to fictionalized portrayal (Guglielmi, supra, 25 Cal. 3d at pp. 871–872. 160 Cal. Rptr. 
352, 603 P.2d 454; see also Parks v. Laface Records (E.D.Mich.1999) 76 F.Supp.2d 775, 
779–782 [use of civil rights figure Rosa Parks in song title is protected expression] ), from 
heavy-handed lampooning (see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 
876, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41) to subtle social criticism (see Coplans et al., Andy Warhol (1970) pp. 
50–52 [explaining Warhol‘s celebrity portraits as a critique of the celebrity phenomenon] ). 
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809 (citations in original). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
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would be dispositive.  One can never exploit the potential market for an 
unauthorized biography about oneself nor should one be able to be com-
pensated for news reporting about oneself.  In contrast, commercial en-
dorsements of products or services have a robust market that should never 
give rise to claims that the endorsement was a transformative use of the ce-
lebrity’s identity interests. 
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its approach in Winter v. DC 
Comics.122  Because the work in question was an expressive literary work, 
in this case a comic book, the court reiterated two important limitations for 
publicity rights it espoused in Comedy III: 
We made two important cautionary observations.  First, ―the right of publicity 
cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be a right to control the celebrity‘s 
image by censoring disagreeable portrayals.  Once the celebrity thrusts himself or 
herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment dictates that the right to 
comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the celebrity 
image must be given broad scope.  The necessary implication of this observation 
is that the right of publicity is essentially an economic right.  What the right of 
publicity holder possesses is not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent oth-
ers from misappropriating the economic value generated by the celebrity‘s fame 
through the merchandising of the ‗name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness‘ of the celebrity.‖  Second, ―in determining whether the work is transforma-
tive, courts are not to be concerned with the quality of the artistic contribution—
vulgar forms of expression fully qualify for First Amendment protection.  On the 
other hand, a literal depiction of a celebrity, even if accomplished with great 
skill, may still be subject to a right of publicity challenge.  The inquiry is in a 
sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative 
or the creative elements predominate in the work.‖123 
In the comic book, Texas recording artists, Johnny and Edgar Winter 
were depicted as ―villainous half-worm, half-human offspring.‖124  Given 
the limitations placed on publicity rights that they not be used to censor 
disagreeable portrayals nor avoid vulgar expression, the two most signifi-
cant complaints regarding the Winters‘ depictions properly became irrele-
vant.  The court also made clear that subtleties of interpretation between 
parody and satire suggested by the Supreme Court in Campbell were inap-
plicable in the case of publicity rights.125  In doing so, the California court 
signaled a much wider berth should be given for the editorial use of pub-
licity rights than fair use is afforded for copyright law.  By determining that 
the use of the redrawn figures could be used for the comic books, the Cali-
fornia court made clear that most insertions of caricatures of celebrities in 
other literary works would be considered a transformative use protected by 
the First Amendment. 
 
 122 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
 123 Id. at 478. 
 124 Id. at 475. 
 125 Id. at 479; cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994); Dr. Seuss En-
ters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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In contrast to the transformative, fair use analysis adopted by Califor-
nia, an interpretation of an Oklahoma statute very similar to the California 
publicity statute did not feel free to incorporate fair use doctrine.126  In-
stead, in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,127 the 
court directly balanced the interest of the First Amendment rights against 
the benefits of protecting publicity rights.128  As the Tenth Circuit com-
mented, ―In resolving the tension between the First Amendment and pub-
licity rights in this case, we find little guidance in cases involving parodies 
of other forms of intellectual property.‖129  Absent statutory reference to 
fair use, the court found itself unable to incorporate the copyright law into 
the state’s publicity statute130: 
This case instead requires us to directly balance the magnitude of the speech re-
striction against the asserted governmental interest in protecting the intellectual 
property right.  We thus begin our analysis by examining the importance of Card-
toons‘ right to free expression and the consequences of limiting that right.  We 
then weigh those consequences against the effect of infringing on MLBPA‘s 
right of publicity.131 
Having set itself the task of determining the value and social utility of 
publicity rights, the Tenth Circuit opined that neither the economic incen-
tives nor the non-economic incentives involved are all that compelling as 
compared to the benefits of parody.132  Summarizing the analysis of the 
Cardtoons decision, a district court described the balancing as: 
Economic interests that states seek to promote include the right of an individual 
to reap the rewards of his or her endeavors and an individual‘s right to earn a liv-
ing.  Other motives for creating a publicity right are the desire to provide incen-
tives to encourage a person‘s productive activities and to protect consumers from 
misleading advertising.  But major league baseball players are rewarded, and 
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional large 
sums from endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.  Nor is there any danger 
 
 126 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 970. 
 130 Id. at 970–71. 
 131 Id. at 972. 
 132 Id. at 976 (citing Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 128 (1993)).  Because celebrities take on personal meanings to 
many individuals in the society, the creative appropriation of celebrity images can be an important ave-
nue of individual expression.  As one commentator has stated: 
Entertainment and sports celebrities are the leading players in our Public Drama.  We tell 
tales, both tall and cautionary, about them.  We monitor their comings and goings, their 
missteps and heartbreaks.  We copy their mannerisms, their styles, their modes of conver-
sation and of consumption.  Whether or not celebrities are ‗the chief agents of moral 
change in the United States,‘ they certainly are widely used—far more than are our institu-
tionally anchored elites—to symbolize individual aspirations, group identities and cultural 
values.  Their images are thus important expressive and communicative resources: the pe-
culiar, yet familiar idiom in which we conduct a fair portion of our cultural business and 
everyday conversation. 
Madow¸ supra, at 128  (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
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here that consumers will be misled, because the fantasy baseball games depend 
on the inclusion of all players and thus cannot create a false impression that some 
particular player with ―star power‖ is endorsing CBC‘s products. 
Then there are so-called non-monetary interests that publicity rights are some-
times thought to advance.  These include protecting natural rights, rewarding ce-
lebrity labors, and avoiding emotional harm.  We do not see that any of these in-
terests are especially relevant here, where baseball players are rewarded 
separately for their labors, and where any emotional harm would most likely be 
caused by a player‘s actual performance, in which case media coverage would 
cause the same harm.  We also note that some courts have indicated that the right 
of publicity is intended to promote only economic interests and that non-
economic interests are more directly served by so-called rights of privacy.  For 
instance, although the court in Cardtoons, conducted a separate discussion of 
non-economic interests when weighing the countervailing rights, it ultimately 
concluded that the non-economic justifications for the right of publicity were un-
persuasive as compared with the interest in freedom of expression.  ―Publicity 
rights . . . are meant to protect against the loss of financial gain, not mental an-
guish.‖  We see merit in this approach.133 
Although the outcome of the case is correct, the dismissal of the 
state’s interest in protecting publicity rights was inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Zacchini and utterly dismissive of the legislative 
power of a state to recognize and regulate the property interests of its citi-
zens.  The difficulty caused by the Cardtoons approach is the categorical 
balancing of free expression against publicity rights rather than judging the 
particular use of identity interests as weighed against competing but signif-
icant governmental interests.  Perhaps the best that can be said regarding 
the Cardtoons decision was the characterization by the California Supreme 
Court: ―While Cardtoons contained dicta calling into question the social 
value of the right of publicity, its conclusion that works parodying and ca-
ricaturing celebrities are protected by the First Amendment appears unas-
sailable in light of the test [adopted in California].‖134 
Although not persuaded by Cardtoons, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
also rejected the California transformative fair use test and other jurisdic-
tional precedents.135  It found that the California approach could lead to un-
intended and undesirable third party use.  It rejected Comedy III because 
―the transformation or fictionalized characterization of a person‘s celebrity 
status is not actionable even if its sole purpose is the commercial use of that 
person‘s name and identity.‖136  The Missouri Supreme Court instead 
sought a more accommodating balance of interests to address expressive 
works used for commercial exploitation.  The Court adopted Mark Lee‘s 
 
 133 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 
824 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973–76) (internal citations omitted). 
 134 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
 135 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363,  374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 136 Id. 
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suggestion of a ―predominant use test‖137: 
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an 
individual‘s identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity 
and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some ―expressive‖ 
content in it that might qualify as ―speech‖ in other circumstances.  If, on the 
other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an expressive 
comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater 
weight.138 
The Missouri Court also rejected the Restatement ―relatedness‖ ap-
proach because it again objected to the categorical nature of the test.139  In 
the relatedness test, unauthorized parties are free to use another person’s 
name or identity in a work that is ―related to‖ that person.140  The Restate-
ment provides the simplest test, harkening back to the axiomatic rule that 
publicity rights protect a person from others exploiting that person’s identi-
ty to sell a good or service without permission by stating that ―if the name 
or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to 
the identified person, the user may be subject to liability for a use of the 
other’s identity in advertising.‖141  The relatedness test essentially boils 
down to a simple question whether the identity was used in an advertise-
ment, in packaging, or on a product.142  If the identity was used in this fa-
shion without permission, it is actionable.  Used in almost any other man-
ner, the use does not violate publicity rights.143 
The Missouri Supreme Court required a careful balancing approach 
because it was upholding the finding of liability against a comic book au-
thor in a case not too dissimilar from Winter.  In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,144 
Todd McFarlane created a comic book character using the name of St. 
Louis Blues hockey ―enforcer‖ Tony Twist for a mafia goon and enforcer 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Public-
ity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2002)). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 373 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995)) 
 141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c. (1995)) 
 142 In this simplistic but perhaps preferable approach, mugs, lunch boxes, and posters should be 
considered commercial products.  Photographs, lithographs, and all expressive media—including news-
papers, magazines, radio, television, motion pictures, video games, virtual worlds, and plays—would be 
expressive and outside of concerns regarding publicity rights claims.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995).  Tee-shirts create the most difficult category because they 
often serve an expressive purpose, but are also often the source of copyright and trademark piracy.  
Given the First Amendment importance, tee-shirts might be best treated as expressive for publicity 
rights purposes, though still subject to copyright and trademark law protections.  Whatever arbitrariness 
such an approach introduces, it removes the case-by-case analysis required by present law, which may 
result in a chilling effect and substantial self-censorship inevitable to avoid potential liability and the 
costs associated with litigation. 
 143 Such a formulation does not preclude liability for misrepresenting the endorsement or in-
volvement of a person.  False endorsements, inclusion of researcher‘s names in grant applications and 
other fraudulent activities would still be actionable under various unfair competition doctrines unrelated 
to publicity rights. 
 144 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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in the popular Spawn comic.145  Unlike the depictions in Winter, McFarlane 
used only the plaintiff’s name, adding no demonic caricature of Twist.146  
Nonetheless, on remand the court held a damage award of fifteen million 
dollars.147  The Missouri Supreme Court explained the result, at least in 
part, based on the marketing of the comic as hockey merchandise because 
of the steps taken to market Spawn to hockey audiences.148 
The predominant test here creates a substantial risk of liability for au-
thors well beyond the economic protections suggested by Zacchini or any 
other courts.149  The mere use of a name within an expressive comic book 
whether or not combined with an unrelated likeness would have been suffi-
ciently transformative under Comedy III to avoid liability in California.  
The use would have also avoided any liability under the relatedness test of 
the Restatement since the use was not used to sell the comic, but was in-
stead, related to the common attributes of this hockey player to mafia 
goons.  Given the chilling effect of the damage award, Doe provides a 
strong illustration regarding the benefits of a narrow, bright line test as 
suggested by the Restatement. 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has gone the furthest to reconcile the cas-
es and provide thoughtful protection for both the First Amendment and 
publicity rights.  In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,150 the commercial 
sports artist Rick Rush painted a montage of golf phenomenon Tiger 
Woods winning his first Masters Tournament in Augusta, Georgia in 
1997.151  The ETW decision emphasized the Restatement‘s comments in 
helping to shape the contours of the right.  The court accepted a theme from 
the Cardtoons decision: ―The rationales underlying recognition of a right of 
publicity are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in 
trademarks or trade secrets.‖152 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 366. 
 147 Doe v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., No. 9725-9415 B, 2004 WL 5294356M (Mo. Cir. Aug. 23, 
2004) (Trial Order). 
 148 Id. at 371 (noting that ―respondents marketed their products directly to hockey fans‖). 
 149 Had McFarlane used the name of Twist in those marketing efforts (as opposed to the mere use 
of the name of a character within the comic book), then the trademark balancing approach suggested in 
Rogers v. Grimaldi would have been more appropriate. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d 
Cir. 1989) and text accompanying infra note 188. 
 150 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 151 Id. at 918. The painting was far more than a simple portrait: 
In the foreground of Rush‘s painting are three views of Woods in different poses.  In the 
center, he is completing the swing of a golf club, and on each side he is crouching, lining 
up and/or observing the progress of a putt.  To the left of Woods is his caddy, Mike ―Fluff‖ 
Cowan, and to his right is his final round partner‘s caddy.  Behind these figures is the Au-
gusta National Clubhouse.  In a blue background behind the clubhouse are likenesses of 
famous golfers of the past looking down on Woods.  These include Arnold Palmer, Sam 
Snead, Ben Hogan, Walter Hagen, Bobby Jones, and Jack Nicklaus.  Behind them is the 
Masters leader board. 
Id.  
 152 Id. at 930 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 46 cmt. C (2005)). 
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The Sixth Circuit emphasized the need to adopt broad First Amend-
ment protections for expression in order to foster a robust creative envi-
ronment.  Quoting Judge Kozinski from his dissent in White v. Samsung,153 
the Court noted that: 
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.  Creativi-
ty is impossible without a rich public domain. . . . Intellectual property rights 
aren‘t free: They‘re imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at 
large. . . . This is why intellectual property law is full of careful balances between 
what‘s set aside for the owner and what’s left in the public domain for the rest of 
us . . . .154 
The Kozinksi dissent does not embrace the Cardtoons facial balancing 
of speech and property rights.  It embraces the need to manifest a vibrant 
public domain and free speech ethos through a careful balance between the 
rights holder and the public.  The Sixth Circuit has attempted to weave 
these various threads together in a more careful and nuanced manner than 
other jurisdictions, incorporating rather than rejecting the cases that have 
been decided in other jurisdictions: 
We conclude that in deciding whether the sale of Rush‘s prints violate Woods‘s 
right of publicity, we will look to the Ohio case law and the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION.  In deciding where the line should be drawn 
between Woods‘s intellectual property rights and the First Amendment, we find 
ourselves in agreement with the dissenting judges in White, the Tenth Circuit‘s 
decision in Cardtoons, and the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Hoffman,155 and we 
will follow them in determining whether Rush‘s work is protected by the First 
Amendment.  Finally, we believe that the transformative elements test adopted 
by the Supreme Court of California in Comedy III Productions, will assist us in 
determining where the proper balance lies between the First Amendment and 
Woods‘s intellectual property rights.156 
By incorporating all the disparate sources of law into the analysis of 
Rush’s artwork depicting Woods‘ victory at Augusta, the Sixth Circuit 
sought to bring balance and harmony back to the law of publicity rights.  
The court went on to discuss the highly creative and transformative work 
created by Rush, which met the transformative test set out in Comedy III, 
and allowed for a finding that no publicity rights were implicated.157  De-
spite the invitation to integrate the case law, courts continue to apply the 
various tests as set out by state and federal courts without the care or syn-
thesis suggested by the Sixth Circuit.  As a result, the precedential value of 
any particular case remains somewhat suspect. 
 
 153 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1993) rehearing en banc denied, 
989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 154 White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 155 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (doctored photograph of 
Dustin Hoffman in drag, standing in a pose simulating Tootsie motion picture poster was held protected 
speech when used as a magazine cover) (footnote not in original quote). 
 156 ETW, 332 F.3d at 936 (footnote omitted). 
 157 Id. at 936–37. 
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F. Intersections with Trademark Fair Use and First Amendment 
Protection 
In almost every publicity rights case, the plaintiffs are also able to 
bring a cause of action for either a registered trademark158 or an unregis-
tered mark under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.159  Tiger Woods, for ex-
ample, has a registered trademark in both ―Woods‖ and ―Tiger Woods,‖160 
while singer Tom Waits and athlete Kareem Abdul-Jabbar have raised un-
fair competition claims using section 43(a).161  Professional athletes in 
league sports may have registered trademarks in their names, while the pro-
fessional sports leagues for which they play own the registered trademarks 
in the team names, logos, and related team indicia.  Section 43(a) adds pro-
tection to stop a false endorsement, ―which is likely to confuse consumers 
as to the [celebrity‘s] sponsorship or approval of the product.‖162 
Like copyright law and publicity rights, trademark law limits the ex-
clusivity afforded by trademark.163  First, any party who wishes to use 
trademarks can do so if such use does not create a likelihood of confu-
sion.164  Moreover, as a defense to trademark infringement, trademark law 
generally recognizes two fair use exceptions and a First Amendment excep-
tion to allow third parties to exploit trademarks and trade dress without ex-
press permission.165 
Under traditional trademark fair use, the words which are owned as a 
trademark can be used as fair use when accurately describing a company’s 
own good or service.  For example, although ―VCR-2‖ is a legitimate 
trademark for Go-Video, the trademark holder cannot stop JVC from using 
VCR-2 to label the second VCR input jack on the back of its own devic-
es.166  Trademark law was not ―meant to deprive commercial speakers of 
 
 158 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2000) 
 159 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).  The provision protects against false designation of origin as to the 
sources of goods and services and protection against the false advertising of goods and services.  See, 
e.g., E.S.S. Entm‘t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1027 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 160 ETW, 332 F.3d at 920–21. 
 161 Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 
978 F.2d 1093, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
 162 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110. 
 163 E.g., ETW, 332 F.3d at 920. As an initial matter, trademark law ―provides a defense to an in-
fringement claim where the use of the mark ‗is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . which is descriptive 
of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods . . . of such party . . . .‘‖ Id. (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)). 
 164 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004).  Addi-
tional protections are available for ―famous mark[s],‖ but such protection is beyond the scope of this 
article.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). 
 165 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 166 In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 11 F.3d 1460, 1467 (9th Cir. 1993).  
For two other examples, see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc, 543 U.S. at 123 (2004) and Brother Records, 
Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (Fair use ―applies only to marks that possess both a 
primary meaning and a secondary meaning—and only when the mark is used in its primary descriptive 
sense rather than its secondary trademark sense.‖). 
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the ordinary utility of descriptive words.‖167 
The second form of trademark fair use is nominative fair use.  A party 
may properly use the trademark of another to accurately describe the 
trademark owner‘s product.  For example, an independent Volkswagen re-
pair mechanic was allowed to use the trademark Volkswagen in its adver-
tising to show the makes and models for which it provides service.168  Such 
accurate descriptions are allowed ―even if the defendant‘s ultimate goal is 
to describe his own product.‖169 
The test for application of trademark fair use is in a state of flux.  
While the dominant case law has developed in the Ninth Circuit, recent Su-
preme Court jurisprudence has called the test into question.  For purposes 
of comparing the approach to publicity rights, the tests of both the Ninth 
and Third Circuits are instructive. 
Under the Ninth Circuit approach, the following characterization ap-
plies: 
[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s product rather 
than its own product, a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use de-
fense provided the defendant meets three requirements: [T]he product or service 
in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; on-
ly so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to iden-
tify the product or service; and the user must do nothing that would, in conjunc-
tion with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark 
holder.170 
The Third Circuit has modified the Ninth Circuit test with its own 
three-prong analysis: 
Is the use of plaintiff‘s mark necessary to describe (1) plaintiff‘s product or ser-
vice and (2) defendant‘s product or service?  Is only so much of the plaintiff‘s 
mark used as is necessary to describe plaintiff‘s products or services?  Does the 
defendant‘s conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship be-
tween plaintiff and defendant‘s products or services?171 
 
 167 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 122, remanded to 408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005).  On re-
mand, the Ninth Circuit adopted the following set of factors for determining fair use: 
Among the relevant factors for consideration by the jury in determining the fairness of the 
use are the degree of likely confusion, the strength of the trademark, the descriptive nature 
of the term for the product or service being offered by [the defendant] and the availability 
of alternate descriptive terms, the extent of the use of the term prior to the registration of 
the trademark, and any differences among the times and contexts in which [the defendant] 
has used the term. 
KP Permanent Make-Up, 408 F.3d at 609. 
 168 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 169 Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cairns 
v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 170 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing New Kids on the 
Block v. News Am. Publ‘g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 171 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005).  For a 
discussion of the case, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use 
Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1709–10 (2007). 
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Perhaps one of the reasons that the Ninth Circuit developed its particu-
lar articulation has been the extent to which the trademarks in question 
were related to identity issues, such as the band New Kids on the Block172, 
surfer legends, including George Downing and Paul Strauch173, actor, 
George Wendt174, and others for whom their trademarks were their identity.  
It may be that, whatever variation may result from the somewhat different 
articulations of the two competing formulations in general, there will be no 
meaningful difference in cases involving identity or publicity rights.  In 
both categories, the nominative fair use question will turn on whether the 
use of the celebrity‘s identity to properly identify that celebrity suggests 
sponsorship and endorsement.  This also answers the question whether ―the 
true and accurate relationship‖175 is accurate or misstated as well as wheth-
er the extent to which the identity was used was only ―reasonably neces-
sary.‖176 
A billboard for a miniature golf facility, saying, ―Tiger Woods has 
never won on our Golf Course‖ would be accurate, but misleading.  While 
it might be humorous to have a large photograph of Woods in despair as he 
missed a putt, the use of image and name would strongly suggest sponsor-
ship—even if the text of the ad suggests otherwise.  In contrast, a restaurant 
that posts a wall of photographs of famous celebrities taken as those celebr-
ities are eating inside the restaurant accurately reflects that those celebrities 
dined in the facility, and their placement inside the restaurant rather than on 
billboards minimizes any likelihood of consumer confusion that the celebri-
ties are endorsing the restaurant, except to the extent that the individuals 
depicted had dined there. 
The differences in formulation may be significant in certain trademark 
contexts, but the differences should not affect the outcome of cases inside 
computer games and virtual worlds, particularly for trademarks related to 
identity interests. 
One recent case involving computer games helps illustrate the impact 
on the nominative fair use approach.  In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. 
Rock Star Videos, Inc.,177 a district court applied the nominative fair use 
approach of the Ninth Circuit to a claim for trademark and dress infringe-
ment when the plaintiff‘s marks ―Play Pen‖ and ―Totally Nude‖ were paro-
died within the video game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas.178  The court 
did not take the simple expedient of dismissing the claim under the theory 
 
 172 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d 302. 
 173 Downing, 265 F.3d 994. 
 174 Wendt v. Host Int‘l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.1997). 
 175 Century 21, 425 F.3d at 228. 
 176 Downing, 265 F.3d at 1009. 
 177 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1027 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 178 Id. at 1014.  The plaintiff‘s disputed the characterization of the depiction as parody.  While it 
may be true the use could better be said to satirize Los Angeles than to parody the Play Pen‘s name as 
trademark ―Totally Nude,‖ such distinction, if relevant at all, only affects the scope of copyright fair use 
under Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  See id. at 1016 & nn.13–16. 
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that the defendant used the plaintiff‘s mark within an expressive work or 
under the theory that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any use of its marks as 
either a false association or false advertising with a product or service.  In-
stead, the opinion emphasized nominative fair use.179 
The court acknowledged the circularity of applying a nominative fair 
use analysis since ―the lack of anything that suggests sponsorship or en-
dorsement—is merely the other side of the likelihood-of-confusion 
coin.‖180  Not surprisingly, nominative fair use did not apply to the satirical 
use within the video game.  The ‗strip club depicted in the game, the ―Pig 
Pen‖ and copied trade dress did not attempt to refer to the plaintiff‘s prod-
ucts, ―but only to describe their own product.‖181  Instead of applying an 
―other side of the coin‖ analysis, the court could have applied a likelihood-
of-confusion analysis.  This would have created far less difficulty in dis-
missing the claim, because there was no association with any good or ser-
vice being offered by the plaintiff.182 
Partially due to the confusion regarding nominative fair use, trade-
mark law analysis requires an additional or alternative First Amendment 
analysis when expressive works are involved.  The First Amendment limi-
tation on trademark rights attempts to balance the limited property rights of 
the trademark holder with the public‘s interest in an open marketplace of 
ideas and the speaker‘s right to communicate.  ―[W]hen unauthorized use 
of another‘s mark is part of a communicative message and not a source 
identifier, the First Amendment is implicated in opposition to the trademark 
right.‖183  Increasingly, courts have recognized that were they ―to ignore the 
expressive value that some marks assume, trademark rights would grow to 
encroach upon the zone protected by the First Amendment.‖184 
The leading case articulating the balance of the trademark owner‘s 
rights and the expressive rights in creative works was decided by the 
Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi.185  Rogers involved a complaint by 
the famed actress Ginger Rogers regarding the title of a movie—Ginger 
and Fred—which referred to the motion pictures of Fred Astaire and Gin-
ger Rogers as a metaphor, but did not involve or relate to either of the 
screen legends.  Addressing the concern that Roger‘s name was being used 
for the film‘s title, the Second Circuit rejected both a narrow First Amend-
ment exception—that there were ―no alternative avenues of communica-
tion‖186—and the lower court‘s categorical assertion that trademark law 
 
 179 Id. at 1029. 
 180 Id. (quoting Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 909 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 181 Id. at 1036. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Yankee Publ‘g  v. News Am. Publ‘g , 809 F. Supp. 267, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 184 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 185 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 186 Id. at 998; cf. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding 
infringement when ―adequate alternative avenues of communication exist‖). 
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was simply inapplicable to works of artistic expression.187  Steering clear of 
either extreme position, the court announced a balancing of interests be-
tween the trademark holder and the author: 
We believe that in general the Act should be construed to apply to artistic works 
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the 
public interest in free expression.  In the context of allegedly misleading titles us-
ing a celebrity‘s name, that balance will normally not support application of the 
Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, 
or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the 
source or the content of the work.188 
This test requires that there be a relationship between the literary con-
tent of a work and the trademark used in the title of the work as a condition 
of providing First Amendment protection for the speech.  The use of a title 
in a work has at least some commercial aspects, which gives rise to the 
right to protect the public from fraudulent or misleading products and ad-
vertising.189  Such an approach is quite consistent with First Amendment 
jurisprudence that finds little value in commercial speech that is intention-
ally misleading.190 
The Ninth Circuit has taken the same approach, extending Rogers to 
cases involving the use of the trademark ―Barbie‖ in both a song title191 and 
in parody photographs.192  Many courts have also extended the Rogers ba-
lancing test beyond the titles of expressive works to the covers of books as 
well as to trademarks used within the content of the literary work.193  As the 
courts have suggested, ―in deciding the reach of the Lanham Act in any 
case where an expressive work is alleged to infringe a trademark, it is ap-
propriate to weigh the public interest in free expression against the public 
interest in avoiding consumer confusion.‖194  The Sixth Circuit took a simi-
lar approach for the trademark aspects of Tiger Woods‘ name when used in 
conjunction with Rush‘s painting of the golfing victory at Augusta.195 
The Rogers approach thus posits two reasons to restrict the use of a 
trademark or celebrity name.  Either the mark has no artistic relevance to 
 
 187 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. at 999 n.5 (―This limiting construction would not apply to misleading titles that are con-
fusingly similar to other titles. The public interest in sparing consumers this type of confusion out-
weighs the slight public interest in permitting authors to use such titles.‖). 
 190 See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm‘n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); In re 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Servs. Comm‘n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
 191 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding First Amendment 
protection for the song title, ―Barbie Girl‖). 
 192 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 193 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ‘g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494–95 (2d Cir. 
1989); see also 2 THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
10:22 (4th ed. 2007). 
 194 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d. at 494; see also Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 
1183–84 (9th Cir. 2001) (balancing between right of publicity and the First Amendment). 
 195 ETW Corp v. Jireh Publ‘g, 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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the underlying work, or the use of the mark ―explicitly misleads as to the 
source or the content of the work.‖196 
Returning to the marks in Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, the use of 
plaintiff‘s marks—Pig Pen, Totally Nude and nude figure trade dress197—
have relevance to a stylized Los Angeles streetscape in which the marks 
appear, and the marks do not suggest anything to mislead the players of the 
game as to the source or content of the game.  With regard to the source of 
the game, the court pointed out that, ―when First Amendment interests are 
implicated, the Rogers ‗explicitly misleading‘ standard applies, not the tra-
ditional ‗likelihood of confusion‘ test.‖198 
The test regarding consumer expectations is quite important for adju-
dicating the ability of artists and authors to use trademarks within expres-
sive works.  Given the commercialized nature of celebrity endorsements, 
general audiences may tend to assume that any use of a brand name, celebr-
ity identity or other mark is done only with permission.  There is little so-
cial utility, however, in allowing that normative expectation to reduce the 
range of free speech afforded to authors and artists.  When focusing on the 
content within an expressive work, audiences are not harmed by the confu-
sion.  The audience member‘s choice to read, watch, or play has already 
been made.  This was a key factor in the Rogers court, focusing on the title 
rather than on the content within the movie.  The expressive use within the 
movie should have even greater First Amendment protection than the title.  
On the other hand, even protected speech has little utility when it is written 
to be explicitly misleading as to the source.  A video game that claims to be 
the ―approved and official game or web page,‖ has little First Amendment 
protection if it is made without consent and is trying to hold itself out in a 
fraudulent manner to the public.199 
G. Kirby‘s Ride through San Andreas: The State of Virtual World 
Protection 
Courts do not formally attempt to consolidate the copyright fair use 
analysis, the trademark nominative fair use and First Amendment analysis, 
and the publicity rights fair use balancing tests.  But the combination of 
these various tests, as applied in recent case law, suggests a strong trend 
towards protecting free expression and away from identity interests in 
computer games and virtual worlds. 
 
 196 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
 197 E.S.S. Entm‘t 2000, Inc. v. Rockstar Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1020–21 (C.D. Cal 
2006). 
 198 Id. at 1045. 
 199 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).  In contrast, 
the important distinction is how the fictional work is presented to the public.  If someone wishes to pro-
duce a comic parody of commercialization by creating a television skit about the making of a TV com-
mercial using athletes, the producer of the skit should not require permission of the athletes or manufac-
turers to depict real athletes or products in the parody.  The skit producer is not intending to mislead the 
public into thinking the commercial or the endorsement is real. 
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In Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,200 a California appellate court ad-
dressed a right of publicity claim in the context of a Sega computer game 
named, Space Channel 5.201  Plaintiff, Kierin Kirby, lead singer of the re-
tro-funk band ―Deee-Lite,‖ complained that her identity was used for the 
game.  As described by the court, the similarities were quite difficult to im-
agine.  The court had only modest respect for the publicity claims brought 
by Kirby, but nonetheless found that she raised triable issues of fact.202  
The Kirby court rejected the plaintiff‘s suggested rule that the work relate 
to the person parodied by requiring the work to ―say something—whether 
factual or critical or comedic‖ about Kirby the public figure in order to re-
ceive First Amendment protection.203  Despite the plaintiff‘s efforts, refer-
ences to the Restatement test were thus rejected.204 
The California court of appeal applied the transformative test from 
Comedy III—as interpreted by Winter—to find that Kirby was, at best, the 
raw material for Ulala, the character in Sega‘s game.205  The court noted 
that, ―notwithstanding certain similarities, Ulala is more than a mere like-
ness or literal depiction of Kirby.  Ulala contains sufficient expressive con-
tent to constitute a ‗transformative work‘ under the test articulated by the 
Supreme Court.‖206  Such transformative changes included the anime style 
drawing, the height of the animated character, and the difference in dance 
style from Kirby.207  The concern raised by these cases is not the outcome, 
but the focus of the approach.  As applied in Winter and Kirby, California‘s 
fair use test is evolving into a less helpful transformative test.  As described 
in Kirby, the very act of rendering a live person’s likeness into an avatar 
was transformative.  This at least suggests that the rendering alone—the 
translation from photograph to avatar—would be sufficient to make the 
likeness a transformative fair use.  Describing the depictions in Comedy III, 
 
 200 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 201 Id. at 609. 
 202 Id. at 613. 
 203 Id. at 616 (internal quotations omitted). 
 204 See supra notes 132–34 (describing the Restatement test). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
The similarities which gave rise to a triable issue of fact are not mentioned.  Ulala resem-
bles Kirby in certain respects.  Certain of Ulala‘s characteristics and computer-generated 
features resemble Kirby‘s.  Both images are thin, and have similarly shaped eyes and faces, 
red lips and red or pink hair.  Both wear brightly-colored, formfitting clothing, including 
short skirts and platform shoes in a 1960‘s retro style.  In addition, Ulala‘s name is a pho-
netic variant of ―ooh la la,‖ a phrase often used by Kirby and associated with Kirby.  Final-
ly, as the trial court pointed out, both Kirby and Ulala used the phrases, ―groove,‖ ―meow,‖ 
―dee-lish,‖ and ―I won‘t give up.‖  These similarities support Kirby‘s contention her identi-
ty was misappropriated. 
Id. at 613.  The Kirby court‘s description of similarities in the White case is helpful.  White represented 
a ―[n]onconsensual use of robotic image of celebrity Vanna White, dressed in wig, gown and jewelry 
regularly worn by White, turning letters on a game show set designed to look like the Wheel of Fortune, 
constitutes common law appropriation of celebrity‘s singular identity.‖ Id. at 614 (citing White v. Sam-
sung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 207 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 613–14, 616. 
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the Kirby court illustrates its understanding of the difference.  ―The artist 
who created [the Three Stooges drawings], while highly skilled, contri-
buted nothing other than a trivial variation that transformed the drawings 
from literal likenesses of the three actors.‖208  Such an interpretation creates 
a very low threshold for a transformative act.  Moreover, since the trans-
formative test does not take the commercial nature of the use into account, 
it may allow for much greater exploitation of an actor or athlete’s identity 
than had been historically permitted. 
The purpose of incorporating fair use into publicity rights analysis was 
to assure that legitimate respect was given to the free speech rights of art-
ists and authors who used the identity of the famous in their expressive 
works.  As the test is evolving, however, it is losing sight of its role in 
creating a critical accommodation for expressive works. 
Just as the court in Kirby extended Comedy III, the Eighth Circuit has 
extended Cardtoons in C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing v. Major League 
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.209  In C.B.C., a fantasy sports operator 
brought a declarative action asserting its freedom to use ―‗names, nick-
names, likenesses, signatures, pictures, playing records, and/or biographical 
data of each player‘ in an interactive form in connection with its fantasy 
baseball products.‖210  Although no visual images were used in connection 
with the for-profit fantasy league site, most other attributes of identity were 
utilized.  The Eighth Circuit began the analysis by identifying the high so-
cial utility in access to the statistics of America‘s pastime: 
The public has an enduring fascination in the records set by former players and in 
memorable moments from previous games . . . . The records and statistics remain 
of interest to the public because they provide context that allows fans to better 
appreciate (or deprecate) today‘s performances.‖  The . . . ―recitation and discus-
sion of factual data concerning the athletic performance of [players on Major 
League Baseball‘s website] command a substantial public interest, and, therefore, 
is a form of expression due substantial constitutional protection.‖ 
In addition, the facts in this case barely, if at all, implicate the interests that states 
typically intend to vindicate by providing rights of publicity to individuals. . . .  
[M]ajor league baseball players are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their par-
ticipation in games and can earn additional large sums from endorsements and 
sponsorship arrangements.211 
The court thus found that the players‘ claims were precluded by the First 
Amendment.212 
The court saw little in either the economic or non-economic interests 
of the players to offset the public‘s interest in access to game statistics.  
 
 208 Id. at 615. 
 209 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 210 Id. at 823 (internal quotations omitted). 
 211 Id. at 823–24 (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 315 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 212 C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824. 
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Compare this result to a similar case decided in 1970.213  Throughout the 
1960‘s, Negamco‘s Major League Baseball and Big League Manager 
Baseball were sold as sports fantasy games.  The two games ―employ[ed] 
the names and professional statistical information such as batting, fielding, 
earned run and other averages of some 500 to 700 major league baseball 
players, identified by team, uniform number, playing position and other-
wise.‖214  The unauthorized use of the information now protected by the 
First Amendment was barred in the earlier situation.215 
The historical change in the expectation that players control the statis-
tics of their play for purposes of fantasy games dictates the outcome of the 
litigation.  If the court assumes that such an ownership right exists, as it did 
in Uhlaender, then a game manufacturer cannot exploit that right without 
permission.  If the court assumes that no such right exists, as it did in 
C.B.C., then the game manufacturer is free to sell the game.  No empirical 
justification is available to inform this assumption.  It is an essentially arbi-
trary starting point, normatively based. 
Again, a reflection on copyright fair use can provide a more nuanced 
approach as an analogy.216  Without challenging the finding that the public 
has a high interest in the baseball statistics, the assertion does not support a 
finding that the statistics should be controlled by the players or be available 
free to the public.  Free access should reduce the costs to the public, but it 
may also reduce the reliability of the data gathered.  The lack of ownership 
also means the lack of any quality control from the players.  Copyright fair 
use, in contrast, would allow the court to assess the effect on the market.  
To the extent that the fantasy statistics are fully available through licensed 
channels to the public, the public need should be satiated.  To the extent 
that the transaction costs involved in collecting the data are too high to li-
cense the information, fair use should provide an adequate remedy.  In-
stead, the Eighth Circuit has made a value judgment regarding the publicity 
rights of the players as used in an unlicensed commercial fantasy sports 
business.  This is perhaps yet another consequence of the California Su-
preme Court‘s rejection of portions of the fair use test in Comedy III. 
The Restatement‘s relatedness test may provide a better explication 
regarding the shift of player statistics than is suggested by C.B.C. or Uh-
laender.  Board games (Uhlaender) and video games (C.B.C.) are both 
products.  But websites are content, much closer to newspapers and televi-
 
 213 Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). 
 214 Id. at 1278. (―SCIENTIFICALLY COMPUTED [sic] Players are rated in every phase of base-
ball play.  Each pitcher is different and each batter is different. You manage 520 big time players.  Your 
strategy affects the outcome of every game.  This game is Big, Colorful, and True.  220 pitchers and 
300 fielders are included.‖). 
 215 Id. at 1283 (―Defendants have violated plaintiffs' rights by the unauthorized appropriation of 
their names and statistics for commercial use.‖) 
 216 It is only an analogy, since copyright does not provide protection for any of the individual sta-
tistics and the players have not copyrighted work embodying the order, selection and arrangement of 
the statistics in any copyrighted fashion.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
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sion than to lunch boxes or billboards.  As websites and simple ball-and-
paddle videogames converged into virtual worlds, the line was crossed and 
the works became wholly protected speech.  Player data can no longer be 
protected as expression because the data has become the facts and ideas ne-
cessary for communication about the sport.  Fantasy leagues are merely 
another method of that expression.  It is the role of the content, which has 
changed, making C.B.C. correct for its age, just as Uhlaender was correct 
in its era. 
Taken together, Kirby and C.B.C. reflect a strong swing away from 
protecting the identity interests of celebrities and towards free speech inter-
ests of producers for games and virtual worlds.  The very nature of these 
tests suggests a movement away from protecting identity, significantly im-
pacting products currently being sold and under development. 
II.  WHERE SPEECH ENDS IN VIRTUAL WORLDS: WHAT CAN AND 
SHOULD BE REGULATED 
A. Where Publicity meets Free Expression: From Fair Use to Avatar-
Jacking 
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas represents the state of the modern 
case law regarding computer games and virtual worlds.  These games are 
entitled to First Amendment protection, thwarting city and state attempts to 
ban ultra-violent or socially repugnant works.  They are expressive works, 
entitled to fair use and First Amendment protection that allows unautho-
rized use of intellectual property—copyrights, trademarks, and publicity 
rights—to be incorporated into their content.  They are highly valuable 
commercial properties earning their owners tremendous revenue and set-
ting the stage for a high stakes battle regarding the control of the intellec-
tual property contained in these games.  Against this backdrop, it will be 
useful to assess the legal consequences of the introductory example, 
www.PRO.us (―PRO‖), a virtual world incorporating the best and worst as-
pects of Second Life, Madden NFL, and Grand Theft Auto. 
In this hypothetical, Players, Inc.—the for-profit licensing arm of the 
National Football League Players Association—will bring suit against the 
owners of PRO, and will also file take-down notices against the website 
hosting companies where the players‘ trademarks and publicity rights are 
being exploited without authorization.217 
 
 217 Such a lawsuit would be filed not just by Players, Inc., but also by all unions and leagues af-
fected.  The focus on a single plaintiff is for purposes of illustration only.  The league and individual 
teams would bring trademark actions for the use of the registered trademarks, logos and mascots of the 
teams; broadcasters may have copyright claims for copying of television footage and still photography, 
as well as copyright claims for intermediate copying for the use of such photographs and footage into 
what later became the avatars and game graphics.  The players would also be expected to bring defama-
tion claims regarding unsportsmanlike activities and steroid use allowed in the game, and false light 
claims for the use of the identity in gladiatorial games.  This article provides no opinion as to the effica-
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In analyzing the hypothetical case, courts following the Digital Soft-
ware, Kirby, E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, and C.B.C. line of cases will treat 
the game as an expressive work rather than merely a product.  In recent 
cases attempting to ban ultra-violent games, courts have consistently ac-
cepted video games as expressive works.218  Since the various legal tests for 
fair use and First Amendment protection no longer rely on merely catego-
rizing the game as expressive or commercial, however, this recognition of 
video games as expressive is merely the first step in the analysis. 
Turning first to the use of the trademarks within the game, claims that 
PRO is unable to use these trademarks are directly comparable to C.B.C.  
Both the teams and the players will make trademark claims, but both will 
face similar challenges for protection. 
Under trademark law, the teams and leagues would have a stronger 
claim than the players because the use of team names, logos, and colors for 
various fantasy leagues goes beyond the nominative fair use tests of the 
Ninth and Third Circuits.  While the use of the player‘s professional affilia-
tion would be necessary for the user to create one’s team, there is less sup-
port for the claim that names, logos, or colors are necessary to build and 
play the team.  Both the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit nominative fair use 
tests focus on the necessity of the use, and the amount taken suggests that it 
is substantial.  As a result, nominative fair use may provide little protection 
from the teams.  The sufficiency and need for taking will be influenced by 
the expressive use made of these elements. 
Publishers of PRO will assert that the game itself creates a parody of 
the leagues and the values of professional sports.  To-the-death fighting, 
steroid availability, free agency, and interchangeability of players between 
sports all comment on the inherent nature of professional sport.  Taken one 
step further, parody versions of these trademarks, created in a whimsical 
fashion like that in Cardtoons, would take less of the original and enhance 
the expressive elements. 
The additional analysis required under the First Amendment further 
reflects a predisposition to protect free expression.  It is quite difficult to 
parody the teams or players without access to the team names, colors, or 
logos.  The public interest in the free expression will outweigh any con-
cerns regarding likelihood of confusion.219  The satirical view of profes-
sional sports built into the game will have a strong influence on the First 
Amendment defense. 
For the players, nominative fair use should eliminate any trademark 
 
cy of those additional causes of action. 
 218 See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass‘n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d, 954 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Video Software Dealers Ass‘n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass‘n 
v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Midway Games, 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 
2002). 
 219 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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claims they may have.  The names and images refer directly to the players.  
The relationship between the game and the players should be clear from the 
game play, use of disclaimers, and the sophistication of many in the online 
community.220  The transformative test applied in the Ninth Circuit to pub-
licity rights, though not applying the same legal standard, is also helpful to 
use as a comparison.  The Three Stooges T-shirts at issue in Comedy III 
were not transformative because, although they were skillful and careful 
reproductions of the likeness of the Three Stooges, they were merely accu-
rate drawings, with nothing else added to the canvas, reflecting only a copy 
of the actors‘ images.221  In PRO, there is an overwhelming amount of ad-
ditional content, manipulation of the images, the use of the images in the 
games, and the implicit social commentary of the players, leagues and 
sports.  Like the image of Tiger Woods being embraced by golf‘s pantheon, 
the players‘ images are merely a part of the message communicated. 
In the context of nominative fair use, courts following the reasoning of 
these cases will likely allow PRO to use the entirety of an identity.  Given 
the extensive nature of the game and the comprehensive, highly transfor-
mative use to which the identity is put, celebrities and athletes should ex-
pect to have little ability to stop such use.  Like an unauthorized biography, 
there is no amount of detail that crosses the line because of the context in 
which the raw material is used. 
The publicity rights claims will follow the same line of reasoning for 
the transformative test of the Ninth Circuit and the related balancing test in 
the Sixth Circuit.  Even assuming that the court did not follow Kirby‘s 
overzealous approach of characterizing the mere creation of the character 
as a transformative act, the use to which the PRO characters are put seems 
to be highly transformative.  The users can manipulate the names and like-
ness to create new characters, cast those characters into a variety of sports, 
enhance the play of the characters, and evolve the people in a wide variety 
of ways.  Such use bespeaks the ―raw material‖ envisioned under Califor-
nia law.  Given the protection afforded to free expression under Kirby and 
C.B.C., courts would find it difficult to rule against PRO even if the judges 
found the content undesirable. 
To the extent that Doe v. TCI Cablevision creates any inconsistency in 
the court decisions, the facts of that decision render it far less persuasive.  
Doe emphasized that the commercial exploitation of hockey players oc-
curred in a manner unrelated to the comic book, Spawn, but directly related 
 
 220 The game has violent aspects not appropriate for young children.  Assuming steps are taken to 
verify that the game has a 13+ rating and the marketing is not geared at young children, the argument 
that the youth playing the game are more likely to be confused should have little weight.  Teens gener-
ally seem quite discerning regarding their brands and do not require extra protection for trademark con-
fusion. 
 221 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) (finding that an 
artist accurate rendering of a celebrity image was not sufficiently transformative to receive First 
Amendment Protection). 
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to marketing efforts to sell the comic books.222  A parallel between Doe and 
PRO would only exist if PRO utilized the players‘ likenesses to target the 
marketing of the game.  Given the factually specific nature of Doe, there is 
little chance that Doe would sway a court‘s opinion. 
Having said that, the outcome could depend on the jurisdiction in 
which the case is brought.  The Missouri court would be highly critical of 
the analysis described above.  As in Doe, the creators of PRO are empha-
sizing the game for the sports fan.  The more a gamer knows of players and 
statistics, the more valuable the game features become.  The use of real 
players is unequivocally intended to create a commercial advantage for the 
producers of the game.223  Applying ―a sort of predominant use test,‖224 
PRO‘s producers would be hard pressed to establish that the predominant 
purpose of the game was ―to make an expressive comment‖ on or about a 
player or players.225  This very narrow exception to publicity rights requires 
the object of the publicity rights claim to be the subject of the work at is-
sue.  Although taken as a whole, the players are the subject of the game, the 
emphasis of the work is on the game play, and not on the players.  Real 
identities are not required to make the game work or even to comment on 
the violence or drug use associated with professional sports.  Were a court 
to closely follow Doe, the players would be much more likely to have their 
identity rights protected. 
The Doe approach highlights the economics underlying the game.  
Why should the players be forced to forgo income that will be made by 
third parties?  By including the effect on the market, copyright fair use in-
cludes the ability to assess this question.  But at present, only Zacchini rei-
terates this concern.226  Even under Zacchnini‘s approach, however, a court 
can distinguish the right of the player to control his or her performance 
from the right to recreate a user-generated performance based on attributes 
of the performer.  Under a proper copyright fair use approach, courts would 
find fair use because a voluntary license is unlikely, given the nature of the 
parody in PRO. 
B. Finding Balance among the Balancing Tests 
The Missouri predominant use test goes too far in requiring a direct 
reference to the particular celebrity as a prerequisite to protecting free ex-
pression interests.  On the other hand, California goes too far in excluding 
 
 222 Id. at 371. 
 223 See id. at 369. 
 224 Id. at 374. 
 225 Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Public-
ity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)). 
 226 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (―The rationale for [protect-
ing the right of publicity] is the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of 
good will.‖ (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966))). 
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the market effect from publicity fair use analysis.  The full fair use analysis 
of copyright provides such a synthesis, as does the combination of trade-
mark law’s fair use, nominative fair use, and First Amendment defenses. 
Copyright, of course, is not an entirely useful comparison.  If the play-
ers were literary characters or comic book characters, then PRO would be 
an infringing work.  The copyright in a celebrity’s authorized avatar will 
have greater legal protection than the publicity rights available to the per-
son behind the avatar.  The extensive use of the characters in a video game 
would be an unauthorized derivative work.227  But the players are not them-
selves the work.  The identity rights protected for humans are far less than 
the literary rights of characters protected for their authors. 
Looking to a comprehensive fair use copyright analysis, the unautho-
rized use of the names and likeness would be balanced against the com-
mercial nature of the game; the highly transformative use of the identities; 
the entirety of the identities taken; and the potential effect on the market.  
The effect on the market for publicity rights is an important factor under a 
copyright-style analysis.  Although PRO does not substitute for watching 
professional sports, PRO does directly compete with Madden Sports and 
other licensed toys and games.  The economic rights to the market will be 
affected by PRO.  So either all of these products should no longer be pro-
tected, or PRO will require a license.  This is an accurate reflection of fair 
use, but it also has problematic consequences. 
A fair use approach to publicity rights ignores the transaction cost dif-
ficulties of such a doctrine.  Fair use, as applied in the copyright context, is 
a highly fact specific regimen which may create a significant chilling effect 
on content that merely risks running afoul of infringement.  Although this 
problem exists in copyright as well, centuries of practice and industry 
norms have allowed publishers to make many assumptions about the con-
tours of fair use for purposes of quotations, reviews, news, commentary 
and many other unauthorized reproductions of third party content.  The ex-
tent of fair use parody may be hard to predict,228 but many other forms of 
copyright fair use are largely routine. 
In contrast, the two cases that have thus far attempted to create a new 
common law fair use doctrine for publicity rights are quite complex, and 
the role of such fact-specific rules in the mercurial worlds of computer 
games and virtual worlds makes such rule making more harmful than help-
ful. 
A court applying a more comprehensive approach, such as the Sixth 
Circuit, would be more likely to find that the commercial nature of the 
 
 227 Cf. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 584 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding Babe Ruth‘s trade-
mark and publicity rights in his name and likeness insufficient to stop use of photographs in a calendar). 
 228 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); cf. Dr. Seuss Enters. 
v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1575 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
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game and the ability of the publishers and the players to earn revenue, the 
comprehensive use of all attributes of identity, and the history of video 
game licensing would weigh heavily against the transformative nature of 
the game.  Under such a balancing test, it would be hard to predict if PRO 
would be required to license the players‘ publicity rights or permit only fic-
tional avatars to be used. 
Only once the parameters of the online activities become clear can 
usefully predictive fair use rules begin to develop.  Absent good fair use 
rules, the public is probably better served by a rejection of a cause of action 
for misappropriation of performances than it would be if such a cause of 
action existed. 
C. Advertising inside the Game and the Need for Disclosure 
Virtual worlds have the ability to include advertising and commercial 
speech within the game, an attribute that separates them from books and 
other literary works.229  Billboards in video games can be sold to advertis-
ers, or change dynamically depending on the attributes of the game or the 
individual user.230  In PRO, for example, the producers of the game could 
show Gatorade on football sidelines since that product is commonly used in 
real-world football games.231  In the alternative, PRO‘s publishers could 
sell the branding rights to a particular company, create a fictional product, 
or have the product which is displayed be based on the computer browsing 
habits of each user towards the advertiser‘s products.  In the not-too-distant 
future, the choice of drinks advertised in the video game could be based on 
the consumer preferences of the gamer.232  Needless to say, ability to affili-
ate particular products in the game to each gamer‘s user behavior will 
eventually have far-reaching economic consequences to reinforce brands 
and adjust marketing strategies.  Such individuation of advertising would 
also change the relationship between the celebrity and the product to be ad-
vertised or endorsed. 
The commercial endorsements and advertising in virtual worlds 
should be viewed as a form of commercialization rather than expressive 
 
 229 The motion picture industry and television industries are also increasing the incorporation of 
paid commercial content and product placement.  The professional actors involved in these works have 
the ability to negotiate for an income stream from these revenues through collective bargaining agree-
ments. 
 230 See, e.g., Derrik J. Lang, What if watching TV were like playing a game?, MINNEAPOLIS ST. 
PAUL STAR TRIB., Dec, 23, 2007, at F3. 
 231 The technique of replacing advertising within movies has been both exploited and litigated. See 
Sherwood 48 Assocs. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 213 F. Supp. 2d 376, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 76 Fed. 
Appx. 389 (2003) (digital replacements of billboards in New York‘s Times Square for Sony‘s Spider-
man film were not infringing of the building‘s trade dress). 
 232 This could be accomplished through brand surveys, cross-tabulation of the gamer to spending 
and purchasing habits tracked with credit cards and store affinity cards, or inferred through interaction 
with other computer content.  In the latter case, for example, the company could assess the amount of 
screen time (or ―stickiness‖) various products had for each gamer, then incorporate the advertising as-
sociated with the stickiest product on a user-by-user basis. 
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speech because the gamer will be able to move directly to the commercial 
product on the Internet.  Whether the commercial is directly linked to the 
product‘s website or whether the gamer must open a second browser to 
reach the product, the user is much closer to the point of purchase than a 
billboard or television advertisement.  If advertisements or endorsements 
take place inside the game for real products that are readily available for 
purchase, those advertisements and endorsements should require the licens-
ing of the identity. 
Of course, if the commercial is for a ―wacky package‖233 or parody 
along the lines of Cardtoons234, then a lack of commercial payment and the 
parodic nature of the ad can be taken into account.  A comedic TV sketch 
for a ―Bass-o-Matic‖ remains a parody whether on television or playing on 
a television within a virtual world,235 so the placement of an advertisement 
within the virtual world should not materially affect the analysis.  The de-
termination should be based on whether the product is intended to be pro-
moted to a gamer or viewer.  If stadium billboards inside the game show 
celebrities endorsing commercially available products, those billboards 
should be treated the same as their brick-and-mortar counterparts.  A com-
mercial display of a product directly associated with a character or avatar 
should not be treated as transformative merely because the commercial ap-
pears in the game or virtual world. 
The need to identify commercial endorsements and advertising for 
products that occur within the video games and virtual worlds suggests that 
the various tests of fair use, transformative use, and First Amendment must 
be applied to the specific use of the publicity rights within the game rather 
than more generally to the game as a whole.  Similarly, the sale of virtual 
products with publicity rights or trademarks should be treated as commer-
cial transactions if the sale results in an exchange of something of value 
that has economic consequence outside of the virtual environment. 
Unlike the complex balancing surrounding the right fair use approach-
es to publicity rights protection, the concerns regarding the use of publicity 
rights and avatars within the video games and virtual worlds have a rela-
tively simple regulatory solution.  Broadcasting already has comprehensive 
rules for identification of paid sponsorships236 and e-mail advertising re-
 
 233 Wacky Packages, http://www.wackypackages.com (last visited March 25, 2008) (Wacky Pack-
ages are magnets, stickers, and postcards which parody particular brand names such as ―Canaduh Dry,‖ 
―Enlisterine,‖ and ―Cavemanwich.‖) 
 234 Cardtoons, http://www.tilly.com/cardtoons/default.htm (last visited March 25, 2008) (Card-
toons are comic representations of sports athletes packaged as trading cards). 
 235 See Urban Dictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=bass-o-matic, (last 
visited January 16, 2008) (―Coined by SNL alumnus Dan Ackroyd in the 1970s, the bass-o-matic is an 
ordinary blender used to turn fresh bass (fish) into a disgusting red slurry that no one in his right mind 
would actually drink.‖)  See also Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast April 17, 1976); Sat-
urday Night Live Transcripts, http://snltranscripts.jt.org/75/75qbassamatic.phtml (last visited March 10, 
2008). 
 236 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000) (―Announcement of payment for broadcast rules‖); 47 C.F.R. § 
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quires disclosures.237  A simple extension of these laws would create a reg-
ulation requiring that paid advertising and sponsorships be identified for 
the user.  Such a rule would not be difficult to implement, since the law 
could simply require a notice page of the endorsements, sponsorships and 
advertisers included in the product. 
The relevance here is that the disclosure requirement would help de-
fine which uses of an avatar were in furtherance of a commercial purpose 
and which were expressive.  If a person is depicted in a biographical movie 
drinking a Coke, there is no assumption that Coca-Cola paid to have its 
product associated with that famous person.  Listing the companies paying 
for product placement might change that.238  Consider a biographical movie 
of Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall.  Authenticity might require that 
the famed couple‘s actual cigarette brand preferences be shown, but there 
will be a tremendous financial temptation to create a sponsorship opportu-
nity to sell the brand featured in the motion picture.  Were such a produc-
tion made for the Internet, a requirement that the advertisers be listed on a 
web page associated with the site would have little chilling effect.  At the 
same time, the disclosure of commercial endorsement would help satisfy 
the public‘s compelling interest regarding the commercial promotion of 
products. 
D. Who Owns the Unauthorized Content, Anyway? 
Yet one additional wrinkle unique to the issues of virtual worlds is the 
ownership tension between the creators of content in the worlds and the 
publishers of the worlds themselves.  Virtual world publishers require end 
user license agreements, which set forth the contractual rights of the gamer 
and the publisher.239  The terms of service or end-user license agreements 
used in these relationships typically require that user not violate the rights 
of third parties and set forth the ownership of any intellectual property 
created or imported into the virtual world by the user. 
Publishers try to immunize themselves from liability to third parties 
by including provisions in the agreements prohibiting the user from upload-
ing content that violates the rights of third parties.240  As a result, to the ex-
 
73.4180 (2006) (―Payment disclosure: Payola, plugola, kickbacks‖). 
 237 CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7701–7713 and 18 U.S.C. § 1037). 
 238 E.g., SUPERMAN II (Warner Brothers 1980) (the movie prominently featured the Coca-Cola 
sign which adorned Times Square).  For an exact image, see also http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=68hRt0Pz7HI, at time 2:05 of 2:26, (last visited March 10, 2008). 
 239 Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the Virtual 
Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 286–87 (2007); see generally, Steven J. Horowitz, Competing Lockean Claims to 
Virtual Property, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 443, (2007); Andrew E. Jankowich, Property and Democracy 
in Virtual Worlds, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 173 (2005); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The 
Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004). The interpretation and enforceability of these 
agreements is beyond the scope of this article. 
 240 E.g., Reuveni, supra note 239, at 286 n.153 (referring to a Sony end user license agreement). 
GARON 11/10/2008 3:05 PM 
510 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:465 
tent that the use of celebrity publicity rights violates the rights of the cele-
brities, such user conduct is a breach of the agreement.  The consequences 
are typically set out in the agreement, but generally include the right of the 
publisher to terminate the user’s account and prohibit the user from re-
subscribing.241 
The specific contractual language may be important with regard to 
publicity rights.  If the terms of service agreement were to specify copy-
right law and defamation, then publicity rights would be omitted from the 
prohibition.  Were the prohibition written not to violate any other person’s 
―intellectual property rights,‖ then additional ambiguity would be intro-
duced due to the inconsistency of the jurisdictions in labeling publicity 
rights as a personal right, property right, or intellectual property right. 
The agreements may have a similar ambiguity with regard to the rights 
retained by the user and the publisher.  Commercial sites often require that 
players waive any claims to the intellectual property created by the gamer 
inside the game and assign those rights to the publisher.242  In contrast, 
Second Life does not require the users to relinquish the intellectual property 
created and uploaded to the virtual world.243  Each publisher has a slightly 
different variation on the language used. 
Assuming, arguendo, that no third party interests were violated by 
gamers when creating characters and avatars incorporating the publicity 
rights of athletes and performers, then under many of the license agree-
ments, the copyrightable character created from the user‘s adaptation of the 
celebrity would become the property of the game publisher.  The publish-
ers, not the end users, would gain the economic value of these interests. 
It will be highly ironic that courts would encourage a liberal interpre-
tation of First Amendment jurisprudence to allow the creation of these ava-
tars, only to have the rights then transferred by contract to the major com-
mercial publishers by operation of click-wrap contract law. 
III.  REORDERING CHAOS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND BEST 
PRACTICES FOR THE PROFESSIONAL NEIGHBORHOODS OF 
VIRTUAL WORLDS 
At present, the courts reviewing claims for publicity rights have not 
been generous to their owners.  Courts have been highly respectful of the 
free expression for the publishers of virtual worlds and computer games 
and slow to protect the property interests of athletes and performers.  Were 
 
 241 E.g., Sony Online Entertainment LLC Terms of Service, http://www.station.sony.com/termsof 
service.vm (last visited January 15, 2008). 
 242 Id.; see Reuveni, supra note 239, at 263–64. 
 243 See http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php, at section 3.2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) 
(―[S]ubject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, you will retain any and all applicable copy-
right and other intellectual property rights with respect to any Content you create using the Service, to 
the extent you have such rights under applicable law.‖). 
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this trend to continue, it will extend beyond virtual worlds to create a legal 
basis for challenging the type of exclusive deals presently being made by 
EA Sports and other publishers. 
One response to the inconsistent and increasingly unfriendly judiciary 
could be an attempt to change the state laws or enact federal legislation.  
Such laws would inevitably face First Amendment challenges, raising even 
more questions regarding the scope of available protection.244  Moreover, to 
the extent that the judicial approach reflects the political will to protect ce-
lebrity interests, the efforts to protect these rights might result in substantial 
opposition in many jurisdictions.245 
A preferred alternative would be for the professional athletes and ac-
tors to use their collective bargaining clout to establish an appropriate bal-
ance between the economic interests of the players and the expressive in-
terests of the public and the publishers.  Through collective bargaining and 
the establishment of recommended best practices, the celebrities are likely 
to gain an appropriate level of protection while respecting the free expres-
sion and creative interests important in the nuanced balancing between the 
First Amendment and the publicity rights.  The collective bargaining 
agreements, in turn, should include provisions requiring that any other par-
ties in business with the signatories to the collective bargaining agreements 
will also be required to commit to the practices required under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.  In this way the publicity rights provisions will 
extend beyond the bargaining unit to all commonly divisions under joint 
ownership with the employers, and eventually to many of their contracting 
partners. 
A. Collective Bargaining as an Alternative to Regulation 
Collective bargaining provides an excellent gap-filler for those areas 
in which intellectual property law cannot properly balance all inequities.246  
The terms of the collective bargaining agreement can establish the rights to 
compensation, credit, and association of the person’s identity with products 
or services.247 The existing collective bargaining agreements are moving 
from traditional film and television into Internet use and reuse of creative 
content developed by union members.248 
 
 244 Moreover, the analysis described throughout this article is limited to United States law.  Both 
the First Amendment and the publicity rights are highly idiosyncratic to United States law but the for-
eign rules applying to publicity rights, though not dealt with in this article, will turn on different proper-
ty and state interests, depending on the jurisdiction. 
 245 But see S.B. 771, 2007, Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2007) (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 to 
make retroactive publicity rights protection available to those who died prior to January 1, 1985). 
 246 Cf. Toney v. L‘Oreal, 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the Illinois Right of Pub-
licity Act as a gap filler in intellectual property law); Fleet v. CBS, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1911, 1924 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (contract, not copyright or right of publicity, establishes the rights of an actor who volunta-
rily appears in a movie). 
 247 See Welch v. Carson Prods. Group, Ltd., 791 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 248 Peter Sanders, Directors, Studios Reach a Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at A3. 
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Welch v. Carson Productions Group249 provides an example of how 
the collective bargaining agreement provides a more nuanced solution to 
the tensions between publicity rights and production rights than the law can 
provide.  Under section 36 of the Screen Actors Guild Television Agree-
ment then applicable to the dispute, the reuse of a commercial required 
payment to the actors, but also provided a mechanism to allow the produc-
ers to use the commercial if the actor could not be identified or con-
tacted.250  The provision balanced the performers‘ rights with very practical 
considerations regarding the transaction costs involving record keeping and 
reuse of content.  The collective bargaining agreement specified the re-
quired minimum payments and set forth how the reuse would take place.251 
Unlike court decisions, the agreement provides rules for the situation in 
which the party cannot be located.  In this fashion, the agreements can 
move beyond the legal rights of the parties to address the practical difficul-
ties they face. 
Collective bargaining agreements for actors and athletes generally 
reach issues of endorsement and commercial use of images, protecting per-
formers from the unauthorized use of their images to commercialize a 
product.  At the same time, the agreements provide explicit authority to use 
the identity interests of the performers to market, sell, and promote the au-
diovisual work in which the performer appears.  As a result, all rights to 
place the image of an actor on the cover of a DVD case or on posters have 
been acquired. 
For athletes, there are additional considerations.  Because groups of 
players may be used for some commercial endorsements, the collective 
bargaining agreements have the ability to specify the interests of the player, 
the team, and the league.  The rights of a player to use his or her team jer-
sey, team logos, colors, etc., may prove essential to the ability of that play-
er to commercially exploit his or her publicity rights.  When a group of 
players collectively endorse a product, the team may have an economic or 
proprietary interest.  Legal determinations regarding the scope of publicity 
rights are irrelevant to the balancing of these interests and their role in the 
overall bargain between the performers and their employers.  The collective 
bargaining agreement is the law of the deal. 
Under a collective bargaining approach to exploitation of publicity 
 
 249 791 F.2d 13. 
 250 “Reuse of Photography or Sound Track,‖ provides that a producer may not reuse television 
film of an actor in a manner other than that for which the actor originally was employed 
without separately bargaining with the player and reaching an agreement regarding such 
use. . . .  [If] the Producer is unable to find the player, it shall notify the Guild [SAG], and if 
the Guild is unable to find the player within a reasonable time, the Producer may use the 
photography. . . without penalty. . . 
Id. at 14–15 (quoting 1977 Screen Actors Guild Television Agreement (―Green Book‖) § 36) (citations 
omitted) (omissions in original). 
 251 Id. 
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rights in video games and virtual worlds, the publishers receive the right to 
use the identity of a celebrity for noncommercial, expressive activities in 
exchange for clear prohibitions against using the identity for commercial 
exploitation.  In keeping with this basic approach, the following points 
would need to be negotiated: 
The right of publicity would have to be recognized by the publishers and produc-
ers of the video games, websites, and virtual worlds.  The right would extend to 
members of the bargaining unit as well as any other person, except for non-union 
members appearing in crowds or large groups.252 
The definition of commercial activity would be specified to focus on 
the sale, marketing, or endorsement of any product or service offered to the 
public.  It would exclude all expressive, literary or editorial content, and 
provide limited use of unlicensed identity interest for advertising or mar-
keting of the work in which the celebrity appeared as a performer or ath-
lete. 
The publishers and producers would be obligated to make an effort253 
to avoid interfering with the exploitation of the publicity rights by union 
members with products or services which were in competition with the 
products and services for which the union members had existing exclusive 
arrangements.  For example, because Tiger Woods has an exclusive en-
dorsement agreement with Nike,254 absent a compelling editorial need, he 
would be depicted with a Nike shirt rather than a Reebok shirt.  Similarly, 
Serena Williams would be shown using a Hewlett-Packard computer rather 
than an Apple to recognize her exclusive agreement with the manufacturer, 
HP.255  Such a rule would not be absolute, however, and would allow for 
necessary editorial use by the publishers, including the ability to parody or 
satirize the endorsements. 
For athletes, collective bargaining agreements with teams and leagues 
would need to extend to the use of identity interests in computer games and 
virtual worlds.  The publishers and producers would be required to recog-
nize those agreements either by becoming signatories or recognizing the 
third party beneficiary interests and obligations set forth in the players‘ col-
lective bargaining agreements. 
The enforcement of the publicity rights provisions would need to ex-
 
 252 The difference between an outline of the terms and the specific terms is highlighted by this 
concept.  While it may be intuitively easy to understand when a person is featured in an advertisement 
and when a person is merely part of the background, the language necessary to make that distinction 
may be highly technical and beyond the scope of this article. 
 253 Such a clause could range from a contractual requirement to a reasonable efforts obligation.  A 
―best efforts‖ clause would be a reasonable starting point. 
 254 Jason Sobel, Woods Signs Third Multiyear Deal with Nike Golf, ESPN.COM, Dec. 13, 2006, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=2695135. 
 255 See Susan Dominus, Dangerous When Interested, NYTIMES.COM, Aug. 19, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/sports/playmagazine/0819play-serena.html; Kate Maddox, HP 
Serves up TV Spot, B TO B ONLINE, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.btobonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? 
AID=/20070827/FREE/70827004/1078. 
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tend beyond the publisher or producer of the game or site to include the end 
users.  The publishers and producers would accomplish this through inclu-
sion of the provisions in its end-user license agreement.256 
Rules governing the importation of content originally created for tele-
vision, radio, billboard, and motion pictures should be developed.  This will 
allow for better movement of advertising and other content to the games 
and virtual worlds.  For example, a depiction of a drive-in theatre in a vir-
tual world could be running movie trailers, movies, or commercials, and 
the availability of this use must be obtained from both the copyright holder 
and the performers.  Billboards and print advertising should similarly be 
clarified. 
Compensation would be paid to the performers.  The competition 
might be limited to the commercial exploitation only or could be based on 
other uses.  Compensation might even be appropriate in situations such as 
PRO, where substantial revenues are being generated based on the union 
‗members‘ identities notwithstanding the fact that those identities are used 
in an expressive manner.  This reflects the distinction between the editorial 
control over the image and the economic advantage being taken by the use 
of the image.  Such compensation deals, however, would be appropriate 
only where a very substantial taking of identity interests occurred. 
Credit for the performers would be provided and full disclosure of the 
relationship between the celebrities and the characters and avatars would 
make explicit the extent to which permission had been granted for the de-
pictions in each game or virtual world. 
The terms of the agreement will apply to all divisions under the com-
mon ownership of the producers.  The parties to the agreement will not en-
ter into agreements with any third party that does not abide by a substan-
tially similar agreement or an enforceable statement of best practices. 
The producers will provide a notice and take-down mechanism for 
complaints of publicity rights infringement similar to that utilized for com-
plaints of copyright infringement.257 
The particular rule adopted under each of these topics does not neces-
sarily matter.  Different unions will likely seek different outcomes, at least 
initially.  Actors, musicians, and athletes may each have slightly different 
goals for the agreements, and these differing interests will result in slightly 
different resolutions.  Parties will learn from each other as a consensus 
emerges.  The rules provide a much more symbiotic relationship between 
the parties than any that can be derived through court decisions. 
 
 256 See Andrew Jankowich, EULAw: The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making in Virtual 
Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2006); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contract-
ing: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041 (2005). 
 257 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (enacting limitations on liability relating to material online); see 
also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000) (providing protection for private blocking and screening of offensive ma-
terial). 
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B.   Expanding the Jurisdiction through Viral Distribution of the 
Agreements 
To be effective, these provisions must ultimately be fairly ubiquitous 
across the Internet.  Although content on the Internet is not directly regu-
lated, many policies derive from regulation258 or commonly adopted prac-
tices.259  A contract provision, such as the one suggested above in para-
graph nine, that requires the contracting party to enter the same clause with 
its other contracting partners takes on the behavior of a virus, ‗infecting‘ 
every contracting party that comes into contact with the source of the pro-
vision.  These provisions provide that the parties to the first contract are a 
form of third party beneficiary to the subsequent agreements.  Assuming 
these provisions are drafted in a manner consistent with antitrust laws,260 
such provisions can quickly transform the common practices of an industry. 
A practice codified into collective bargaining agreements for those 
companies which are unionized261 and followed as best practices for those 
businesses which have no union agreements will be applicable for a major 
portion of the commercially significant activities on the Internet.  The tech-
nique for spreading new contractual expectations through viral provisions 
in contracts will not extend everywhere, but it should track most of the 
economically relevant activity.  Through the combination of contractual 
and voluntary adoptions, voluntary self-regulation spread virally through 
the transactional web of the Internet. 
The plan to regulate publicity rights in gaming and virtual worlds 
through collective bargaining may appear flawed because the jurisdiction 
appears too limited on both sides.  The Wild West of the Internet is not 
home to extensive collective bargaining agreements.  A closer look, how-
ever, suggests that through the application of these viral contracting tech-
niques, there is both the ability to marshal collective bargaining power 
clout and the economic interests to do so.  This is not a case of traditional 
 
 258 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000) (HIPAA regulations attaching data security obligation to any 
entity having control over the regulated health information). 
 259 An example of this would be voluntary ratings for motion pictures or video games.  See Motion 
Picture Association of America, Film Ratings, http://mpaa.org/filmratings.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 
2008); Entertainment Software Rating Board, http://www.esrb.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2008).  Professor 
Larry Lessig would suggest that the computer code utilized to standardize Internet sites has this de facto 
effect.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999). 
 260 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Language, Deals, and 
Standards: The Future of XML Contracts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 313 (2006); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., To-
wards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 285–88 (2001). 
 261 The non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust laws avoids Sherman Act complications 
when the parties are involved in good faith bargaining regarding topics such as wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions.  Brown v. PRO Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumb-
ers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).  While the antitrust implications are signifi-
cant, they are not likely to interfere with a broadly adopted set of policies, particularly if the policies 
were generally consistent with, and clarifying of, existing law.  Such practices would be reasonable and 
efficient, benefiting competition and trade, and therefore upheld under either the exemption or under a 
rule of reason analysis.  See Connell, 421 U.S. 616. 
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labor-organizing.  The avatars will not be holding rallies, collecting cards, 
or counting votes.  Instead, the willingness to enter into collective bargain-
ing talks will stem from the leverage held by the players and performer un-
ions. 
Many of the most important aspects of the Internet are operated by 
entities that are owned by companies, which in turn have agreements with 
one or more of the relevant bargaining agreements.262  America Online is 
part of AOL/Time Warner.263  AOL also has a working agreement with 
Google.  Disney has extensive ownership of websites as well as ownership 
of ESPN and related properties.  News Corp., the parent company of Fox, 
owns MySpace among other sites.264 
In the video game industry, there is much greater consolidation.  Sony 
is the manufacturer of one of the three principle video game platforms.265  
Microsoft, the maker of a second such player, has co-owned brands with 
General Electric‘s NBC.266  Only Nintendo has no cross-over ownership 
interest, but it has media content, such as Pokémon, which is sold for 
broadcast.267 
Under the viral approach to enforcing the collective bargaining 
agreements, the performers‘ unions initially negotiate for the relevant pro-
vision in collective bargaining agreements with the producers presently un-
der contract.  The ninth provision, listed above, requires that the members 
of the producers or league enforce the agreement by requiring the provi-
sions to be adopted by their contracting partners.  In the first instance, this 
would require that the entirety of a commonly owned enterprise be subject 
to the rules.  The rules would become the ―law‖ everywhere within the em-
pires of GE, Sony, News Corp., Viacom, CBS, or Disney.  Broadcasters 
would feel the pressure from both the actors‘ union and the players‘ union 
and leagues. 
There would, naturally, be some resistance to the proposal because 
payments are required.  But each of these companies also own large portfo-
lios of brands.268  These companies utilize endorsements to promote many 
of their own brands, and they make significant revenue from advertisers 
that seek efficient methods to protect the investment in the performers who 
endorse their products.  As a result, broadcasters, advertisers, and perfor-
mers all have the same interest in promoting a system that recognizes legal 
 
 262 The Nation provides an excellent visual representation.  See Forum, The National Entertain-
ment State, THE NATION, July 3, 2006, at 23–26, available at http://www.thenation.com/special/ 
2006_entertainment.pdf [hereinafter National Entertainment State]. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 The three principle video game platforms are Sony‘s Playstation 3, Microsoft‘s Xbox 360, and 
the Nintendo Wii. 
 266 GE, Microsoft Bring Bigotry to Life, FAIRNESS & ACCURACY IN REPORTING, Feb. 12, 2003, 
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1632 (discussing the co-ownership of the news station, MSNBC). 
 267 Pokémon, http://www.pokemon.com/#tvmovies (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). 
 268 See National Entertainment State, supra note 262. 
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protections.  Properly managed, a campaign by celebrities to win over the 
advertisers and the leagues would emphasize their common interests. 
The negotiations will also be more successful if the balance sought is 
reasonable and consistent with the historical copyright fair use and free ex-
pression approach to balancing ownership and expression.  Publishers will 
appropriately fight attempts to frustrate biographies or unauthorized uses of 
identities.  Producers will defend the right to produce parodies of celebri-
ties on television and on the Internet.  The rules outlined for the collective 
bargaining agreement must not impinge on these acts of commentary, criti-
cism, and public discourse. 
Once the provisions are incorporated into existing collective bargain-
ing agreements and applied to the enterprises in which those bargaining 
units exist, the obligation to recognize these rights will spread quickly 
throughout much of the industry.  Sony will impact a large percentage of 
the video game producers.  Google, Yahoo, and YouTube will be brought 
in through advertising agreements with the various content providers.  As a 
result of contractual relations among the major content producers and ad-
vertisers, many of the sources of advertising will be contractually obligated 
to follow the rules. 
The jurisdiction will extend slowly throughout the Internet, computer 
gaming, and virtual world environment to provide protection for union 
members and non-union members alike.  In this way, it will reach college 
athletes and non-union musicians as well as the professional celebrities 
who are notorious rather than talented.  Although unions are often reluctant 
to extend union benefits beyond their members, such protection is in the 
union’s economic best interest because it precludes the signatory from re-
ducing cost by approaching non-union performers for their rights. 
C. Best Practices for Everyone Else 
There are limits to the model of viral contracting as a method of revis-
ing the normative behavior on the Internet.  First, the collective bargaining 
and contract negotiating process intentionally spreads the obligation some-
what slowly through the media network.  Second, the reach does not extend 
to publishers like PRO, which are user-created or outside traditional media.  
Both of these limits are benefits of the approach. 
For the rules of publicity to gain widespread acceptance, the rules 
need to become part of the normative balance of rights expected by the 
public.  Both copyright269 and trademark270 allow the scope of enforcement 
to be based on the behaviors and expectations of the public.  While not al-
 
 269 See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy 
and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278 (2002) (emphasizing the fact that the public‘s acceptance of 
practices establishes fair use). 
 270 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992). 
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ways effective,271 law in general and intellectual property law in particular 
benefits tremendously from having it reflect accepted behavior rather than 
trying to preclude conduct the public does not generally find inappropriate. 
Particularly within the context of virtual worlds, there needs to be a 
great deal of experimentation before the genre matures.  Some of these ex-
periments will be highly popular and successful; most will go unnoticed.  
Owners of intellectual property rights will waste valuable resources if they 
futilely try to chase every act of infringement.  They will also stymie the 
very innovation necessary for the next stage in growth for immersive and 
interactive media. 
The use of a viral licensing regime helps align the economic interests 
of the parties and leaves those parties with few connections generally out of 
the private ordering.  As an unlicensed project gains momentum, it is likely 
to need contractual relations with an entity under the licensing regime.  At 
that point, the publishers can choose to join the regime or stop growing in 
order to avoid those contractual entanglements. 
The best practices are even simpler than the provisions needed in the 
collective bargaining agreement, because the duties are self-imposed, not 
requiring any provisions for enforcement outside of the virtual world under 
operation: 
1. The right of publicity would have to be recognized by the vir-
tual world. 
2. The enforcement of the publicity rights provisions would need 
to extend beyond the publisher or producer of the game or site 
to include the end-users. 
3. The definition of commercial activity would be specified to fo-
cus on the sale, marketing, or endorsement of any product or 
service offered to the public. It would exclude all expressive, 
literary or editorial content, and provide limited use of unli-
censed identity interest for advertising or marketing of the 
work in which the celebrity appeared as a performer or ath-
lete. 
4. The virtual world and its members would be obligated to make 
efforts to avoid interfering with the exploitation of the publici-
ty rights by celebrities with products or services which were 
in competition with the products and services for which the 
celebrity had existing exclusive arrangements. 
5. Use of publicity rights for commercial activities can only be 
conducted with the permission of the celebrity. 
6. Credit for the performers would be provided and full disclosure 
of the relationship between the celebrities and the characters 
and avatars would make explicit the extent to which permis-
 
 271 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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sion had been granted for the depictions in each game or vir-
tual world. 
7. The producers will provide a notice and take-down mechanism 
for complaints of publicity rights infringement similar to that 
utilized for complaints of copyright infringement. 
These provisions are very similar to the provisions applied to collec-
tive bargaining agreements, and should be relatively easy for operators of 
virtual worlds to add to the end-user license agreements and as practices 
governing their own conduct. 
Over time, many of the entities not otherwise contractually obligated 
to accept the provisions will choose to adopt them as best practices.  If the 
policies are well balanced and take into account both the social desire for 
robust expression and the social desire for accurate, fully-disclosed com-
mercial endorsements, then publishers of websites will recognize that the 
burdens of the provisions are very minor and the benefits to the site’s cus-
tomers are significant. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of new rules for publicity rights in computer games and vir-
tual worlds are best developed through creation of a best practices standard 
and a series of collective bargaining agreements that slowly pervade the on-
line and gaming worlds.  These rules can provide robust protection for ce-
lebrities when their identity is hijacked to sell or endorse products, while 
promoting wide latitude for writers, artists, and publishers to use the identi-
ty when telling stories about the celebrities or merely using celebrities as 
the raw material for other expressive works. 
Private ordering will allow for this newest of intellectual property 
rights to mature, and would avoid the widespread confusion created by the 
multiple tests proliferating among the courts and the somewhat inconsistent 
application of the publicity rights doctrine alongside copyright and trade-
mark law. 
Given the importance of virtual worlds in the future social fabric, a so-
lution to the identity rights chaos is necessary.  Already protected by con-
stitutional law, these worlds‘ content reflects an important new platform for 
public discourse, as ideas and mores are explored within these environ-
ments.  At the same time, these worlds are also sites of commercial transac-
tions, advertising, marketing, and endorsements that take advantage of per-
formers, athletes, and other celebrities to sell their wares. 
Celebrities are likely to embrace this new opportunity only if their in-
tellectual property interests can be protected.  Through the combination of 
collective bargaining agreements and best practices, the problems of court 
interpretation can be avoided, First Amendment challenges averted, and le-
gitimate rights protected. 
Let the games continue. 
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